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Case Notes and Statute Notes
CONFLICT OF LAWS-When There is True Conflict Be-
tween the Laws of States Having Equal Interests, the Law of
the Place of the Injury is to be Used. In Re Air Crash Disas-
ter Near Chicago, Illinois, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
On May 25, 1979 an American Airlines DC-10, designed and
built by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC), crashed in a
field one half mile from Chicago's O'Hare International Air-
port.1 The aircraft had taken off from O'Hare at 3 p.m. on a
sunny afternoon for a nonstop flight to Los Angeles.2 Shortly
after takeoff the plane's left turbofan engine broke off and fell
onto the runway. All 271 aboard and two persons on the
ground were killed, in what was the worst crash in U.S. avia-
tion history.' As a result, one hundred and eighteen wrongful
death actions were filed against American and MDC in Cali-
fornia, Illinois, New York, Michigan, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico.4 The plaintiffs asked for punitive as well as compensa-
tory damages. The cases were transferred to the Northern
District of Illinois for pretrial purposes by order of the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.'
I TIME, June 4, 1979, at 12.
2Id.
'Id.
4 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1981).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) provides:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multi-district
litigation .. upon its determination that transfers for such proceed-
ings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will pro-
mote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.
(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of seven
circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief
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American Airlines, a Delaware corporation, had its princi-
pal place of business in New York at the time of the crash.
American's maintenance base, the site of the alleged miscon-
duct, was in Oklahoma. MDC is a Maryland corporation with
its principal place of business in Missouri. The aircraft was
designed and manufactured by MDC in California.'
Both American and MDC moved to strike the claims for
punitive damages for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted. The district court, following the choice of
law rules of each state where the actions originally had been
filed,8 found that under the Illinois "most significant relation-
ship"9 test, as well as the California "comparative impair-
ment"10 test, the law of the principal place of business should
Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same
circuit. The concurence of four members shall be necessary to any ac-
tion by the panel.
Id. § 1407(a), (d).
' 644 F.2d at 604-05.
7 Id. at 605.
' In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), the Supreme
Court held that the Erie doctrine requires a federal court to apply the same substan-
tive law that a state court in the same jurisdiction would apply, including the forum
state's choice of law rules. Id.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971) provides:
Right of Action for Death
In an action for wrongful death the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties un-
less, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 [Choice of
Law Principles] to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied.
Illinois adopted the "most significant relationship" test in Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.
2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970). In Ingersoll, the administratrix of a decedent's estate
filed a wrongful death action against the driver and owner of the automobile in which
the decedent drowned when the automobile broke through river ice. The court stated:
"Realization of unjust and anomalous results which may ensue from application of
lex loci delicti leads us to believe that the 'most significant contacts' rule best serves
the interests of the State and the parties involved . . . ." 262 N.E.2d at 596.
" Under the "comparative impairment" approach "the respective laws of inter-
ested states are examined to ensure that there is an apparent conflict . . . . [Wihen
an apparent conflict is found to exist, the court reexamines the applicable laws and
circumstances to see if a 'moderate and restrained interpretation' of both the policy
and the circumstances reveals that only one state has a legitimate interest in the
application of its policy. . . . [T]rue conflicts should be resolved by applying the law
of the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were not applied."
644 F.2d at 621 (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320, 546 P.2d
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prevail with regard to the issue of punitive damages." The
district court allowed American's motion to strike the punitive
damage claims but denied MDC's motion.1 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's findings regarding which states allowed punitive dam-
ages, but differed in its application of the choice-of-law theo-
ries. The court found that, as to each defendant, the states
where the principal places of business were located and the
states where the misconduct occured had the strongest inter-
ests, but these interests were equal and in total conflict. 3 The
Seventh Circuit ruled that under the "most significant rela-
tionship" test, when there is a true conflict between the laws
of states having equal interests, the law of the place of the
injury is to be used. Likewise, under the "comparative impair-
ment" test, when the state of the principal place of business
and the state of the place of misconduct have equal interests
in the application of their laws, the law of the place of injury
should be applied. Held, reversed in part and affirmed in
part: When there is a true conflict between the laws of states
having equal interests, the law of the place of the injury is to
be used. In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, 644
F. 2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
I. BACKGROUND
Conflict of laws is an area of the legal system that deals
with the inconsistency between the laws of different states, in
cases in which a party has a relationship to more than one of
these states. 14 Courts have developed "choice-of-law" rules to
719, 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (1976)).
" In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1049, 1051 (N.D.
111. 1980), rev'd, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
" 500 F. Supp. at 1054.
" 644 F.2d at 615, 621, 628.
'4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971) provides:
Reason for the Rules of Conflict of Laws
The world is composed of territorial states having separate and differ-
ing systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and issues arise,
that may have a significant relationship to more than one state, mak-
ing necessary a special body of rules and methods for their ordering
and resolution.
19821
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determine which law should be applied. The traditional
choice-of-law rule that is applicable to torts is known as lex
loci delicti.15 Under this rule, the law of the place of the in-
jury governs the substantive rights of the parties." Thus, if
the Chicago case had arisen twenty years ago, the choice-of-
law questions confronted by the Seventh Circuit could have
been solved easily.
Application of the mechanical lex loci delicti rule, however,
often led to an inequitable result. One of the earliest tactics
employed by courts and counsel to avoid the application of
the rule of lex loci delicti, was to characterize the action as
something other than a tort. The injury, for example, could be
described as a breach of contract.17 Courts and counsel also
sought to avoid the lex loci delicti rule by characterizing the
issue as procedural' 8 or as one involving family law. 9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971) provides:
Subject Matter of Conflict of Laws
Conflict of laws is that part of the law of each state which determines
what effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant
relationship to more than one state.
15 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 2.02, at 6 (9th ed. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as KREINDLER].
16 d.
" See Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928). In Levy, the plaintiff was injured in Massachusetts as a result of his operation
of an automobile rented in Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the rental company for
breach of contract. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the
renter's statutory liability under Connecticut law. See also, Hudson v. Continental
Bus System, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
an action by a Texas citizen, who bought bus tickets in Texas, for damages he sus-
tained when the bus had an accident in Mexico. The court held that the parties were
bound by Texas contract law.
"S See Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942), where
the court held that the right to sue an insurer directly, instead of first obtaining a
judgment against the insured, was a procedural question and therefore the law of the
forum state applied.
" See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955). A mother and her
minor daughters brought an action against her husband and minor son for the inju-
ries the daughters sustained while they were guests in an automobile owned by the
father and driven by the son. The accident occurred in Idaho, but since all parties
were domiciliaries, of California the court looked to California law to determine
whether any disabilities or immunities existed. See also Haumschild v. Continental
Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), an action brought by a wife against
her husband, both of whom were Wisconsin domiciliaries, for the injuries she sus-
tained in an automobile accident in California. The court held that as to which law
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Since 1961, states have been moving steadily away from the
lex loci delicti rule and have been adopting more flexible
rules.20 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines" was the case that be-
gan this trend. In Kilberg, a New York resident who pur-
chased tickets in New York for a flight to Massachusetts, was
killed when his plane crashed in Massachusetts. At the time,
Massachusetts had a wrongful death statute that would have
limited the plaintiff's claim to $15,000. New York had no such
limitation. In an attempt to avoid this limitation, the plaintiff
in Kilberg brought an action for negligent breach of contract.
The plaintiff's counsel also argued that if the court rejected
the contract theory, it should nevertheless refuse to apply the
law of the fortuitous place of the injury, in order to do justice
to the plaintiff.2 2 The Kilberg court did not rely on the con-
tract theory, but treated the question as procedural. They also
found that, as a matter of public policy, New York Law
should be applied to Kilberg's claim. The court stated that
"[iut is open to us, therefore, particularly in view of our strong
public policy as to death action damages, to treat the measure
of damages in this case as being a procedural or remedial
question by our own State policies."2 Because it had placed
some reliance on the "procedural" device, the court claimed
that it had not completely abandoned the lex loci delicti
rule.24
Two years later, the Kilberg procedural approach was taken
a step further in Babcock v. Jackson.2 In Babcock, a New
governs the capacity of one spouse to sue the other in tort, the law to be applied is
that of the state of the domicile.
20 As of the beginning of 1981 only twenty-four states still followed the lex loci
delicti rule. KREINDLER, supra note 15, § 2.02, at 25.
2- 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
22 The attorney for the plaintiff in Kilberg pointed out that Kilberg had lived his
whole life in New York, that he bought the tickets in New York, that his family lived
in New York, and that his estate would be administered there. The attorney argued
that it made little sense to apply the Massachusetts wrongful death limitation to
Kilberg and his family merely because the fortuitous site of the crash happened to be
Massachusetts. He urged that the court find some way to apply New York law. L.
KREINDLER, supra note 15, § 2.02, at 10-11.
23 9 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
24 Id.
2" 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
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York resident was injured in Ontario, while riding in an auto-
mobile driven by another New York resident. If Ontario law
had been applied, the action would have been barred by a
statute prohibiting recovery by a guest from a host driver.2 6
Instead of relying on public policy or a "procedural character-
ization," the Babcock court specifically rejected the rule of lex
loci delicti.2 7 The court adopted a more flexible and subjective
rule, stating that they would give "controlling effect to the law
of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact
with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern
with the specific issue raised in the litigation."2
Following New York's lead, other states abandoned the lex
loci delicti rule.29 The Pennsylvania case of Griffith v. United
Airlines0 had a fact situation that was similar to Kilberg. A
Pennsylvania resident, who had bought his ticket in Pennsyl-
vania, was killed in a Colorado air crash. The Griffith court
stated that "the strict lex loci delicti rule should be aban-
doned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which
permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the
particular issue before the court."3 1 The court, pointing out
that the site of the accident was purely fortuitous, ruled that
Pennsylvania had a stronger interest in having its law
applied. 2
The court in Long v. Pan American World Airways" con-
fronted a different fact situation. In Long, the forum state of
New York was a "disinterested third state," in that it had no
interest in applying its own law to the litigation. The New
York court was not deciding whether to apply its own law or
that of another state, but rather which law of two other states
" Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2)
(1960).
27 191 N.E. 2d at 283.
28 Id.
" See, e.g., Fabricus v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Kopp v.
Rechtzigel, 273 Minn: 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Or. 116,
437 P.2d 107 (1968).
so 426 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
3' 203 A.2d at 805.
11 Id. at 806-07.
.3 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965).
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it should apply. The crash was in Maryland, but the dece-
dent's domicile, the place of the ticket purchase, and the
point of departure were all in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the
court found that Pennsylvania had the dominant interest and
applied that state's law.3
4
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopted a
test similar to the Babcock test. 5 The Restatement states:
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, as to
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 [Choice
of Law Principles].3
Many states began to follow the Restatement's "most signifi-
cant relationship" test, including Illinois, which adopted the
3' 213 N.E.2d at 799.
-1 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963). See supra notes 25-
28 and accompanying text.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) provides:
Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971) provides:
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of §
6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the par-
ties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue.
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test in Ingersoll v. Klein.87
California adoped a somewhat different approach to the
analysis of choice-of-law questions, using a "governmental in-
terest"' test announced in Reich v. Purcell.39 In Reich, an
Ohio plaintiff brought suit against a California resident for a
death that resulted from an accident in Missouri. The court
held that California had no interest in applying its own rule,
which would not limit the amount of damages, to the plain-
tiffs who were non-residents. The court also determined that
Missouri had no interest in applying its rule, which would
limit damages, to non-resident defendants, and therefore
found that Ohio law should be applied. Thus, under the "gov-
ernmental interest" test, the court does not disregard relevant
contacts, but also considers the governmental policies behind
the laws of the states having an interest in the litigation. The
court then decides which law to apply by balancing the inter-
ests of the litigants and the interests of the states involved."
The Reich decision was reinforced and clarified in Hurtado
v. Superior Court."1 In Hurtado, a Mexican citizen was killed
in a California automobile accident. Mexican law limited the
amount of damages recoverable, but California had no such
limitation. The California Supreme Court refused to apply
Mexican law, saying: "Since it is the plaintiffs and not the de-
fendants who are the Mexican residents in this case, Mexico
has no interest in applying its limitation of damages-Mexico
has no defendant residents to protect and has no interest in
denying full recovery to its residents .. . ."" The court
stated that California, as the forum, should apply its own law
when a foreign state had a lesser interest in having its law
applied. 3
87 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970). See supra note 9.
" The leading proponent of the "governmental interest" approach was Professor
Brainerd Currie.See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963);
Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).
67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
40 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
41 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
"" 11 Cal. 3d at 581, 522 P.2d at 670, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
43 Id.
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The "governmental interest" approach was further refined
into a "comparative impairment" approach in Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club44 and Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co.45 In Bernhard a California resident was injured in an au-
tomobile accident by another driver who had become intoxi-
cated at a Nevada tavern. The California resident sued the
owner of the Nevada tavern. The plaintiff alleged that his in-
juries were proximately caused by the defendant's sale of alco-
holic beverages to intoxicated patrons. A "true conflict"'46 ex-
isted between the laws of California and Nevada in that
California permitted a recovery and Nevada did not. Both
states, furthermore, had a legitimate interest in the applica-
tion of their law. The trial court, ruling that Nevada law ap-
plied because the alleged tort occurred in Nevada, dismissed
the complaint. On appeal the California Supreme Court re-
versed and stated that, when a true conflict exists, the court
should "determine which state's interest would be more im-
paired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the
other state. . . . [T]rue conflicts should be resolved by apply-
ing the law of the state whose interest would be the more im-
paired if its law were not applied.' '47
In Offshore Rental a California corporation sued for loss of
services from an employee whom defendant negligently in-
jured on defendant's premises in Louisiana. California law
permitted a corporation to recover damages occasioned by the
41 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
" 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
" Under the "governmental interest" approach a "false conflict" exists where only
one state has an interest in the application of its law. A "false conflict" was con-
fronted by the court in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 552, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967). In Reich, the accident occurred in Missouri, which limited a plaintiffs recov-
ery in wrongful death actions. Neither California, the home of the defendant, nor
Ohio, the home of the plaintiff, had any limitation on damages. Because California
had no limitation on damages it had no interest in protecting its resident defendant
from higher recovery. Missouri's interest in imposing damage limitations was solely to
protect resident defendants, of which there were none. Ohio had an interest in al-
lowing its resident plaintiffs unlimited recovery and was therefore the only state with
an interest.
,1 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court concluded
that California had an important and abiding interest in applying its law, and that
that policy of California would be more significantly impaired if its law were not ap-
plied. 16 Cal. 3d at 322-25, 546 P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
1982]
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loss of a key employee. The court found that Louisiana had
stronger, more current interests in applying its law precluding
a corporate employer from recovering such damages. The
court stated that because "the California statute had histori-
cally been of minimal importance in the fabric of California
law, and the Louisiana courts have recently interpreted their
analogous Louisiana statute narrowly in light of that statute's
obsolesence,"' Louisiana's interests would be more impaired
if its law were not applied.
Commentators agree that the modern conflicts rules make
predicting the results of litigation, advising clients, and set-
tling cases more difficult, 4 and that the move away from lex
loci delicti, in some cases, results in confusion as to the sub-
stantive law to be applied' 0 They point out further that the
problems are greatly multiplied in litigation arising from the
crash of a commercial airliner. In these cases a large number
of plaintiffs may file actions in many different states against
multiple defendants. 1 Each defendant may have to appear in
several states, and if defendants cannot be sued in a single
jurisdiction the plaintiffs may have to sue the defendants sep-
arately in different states." As to each plaintiff and defen-
dant, there may be several states with interests or contacts
that must be considered in a conflict of laws analysis.' States
have different substantive laws and different interpretations
of various relevant legal concepts such as res ipsa loquitur,
theories of warranty, the duty of care owed, wrongful death
,8 22 Cal. 3d at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
49 See Hailer, Death in the Air: Federal Regulation of Tort Liability a Must, 54
A.B.A.J. 382 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Haller].
" Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation: A
Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 231, 235 (1976).
"' See Hailer, supra note 49, at 385. See also Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A
Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 1S Am. U.L. Rav. 299 (1968) [herein-
after cited as TydingsJ. See also infra note 124.
"2 See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal.
1975). As a result of an air crash that killed all 346 aboard, two hundred lawsuits
were filed all across the country. Approximately one thousand plaintiffs from twenty-
one countries sued the air carrier, two manufacturers and the United States
Government.
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
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and standing to bring suit."1 There is also a variety of choice-
of-law rules among the states.55 This mass of litigation places
great procedural burdens on the parties and often leads to in-
consistent results.'6
If the actions are consolidated and transferred to a single
federal district court,7 some of the procedural burdens on the
parties are eased, but commentators have recognized that the
possibility of obtaining inconsistent results remains.'8 A fed-
eral court is bound to apply the choice-of-law rule of the state
in which it sits,59 and a transferee court is required to apply
the law the transferor court would have applied.10 A federal
transferee court is left with the problem of determining the
nature and methods of application of each state's choice-of-
law rule. If the transferee court's analysis causes it to apply
different substantive laws in the same courtroom, substantial
inequities may result. Plaintiffs situated identically and
presenting the same evidence can recover different amounts in
" For a more detailed discussion of differing tort rules see Comment, Air Crash
Litigation: Disaster in the Courts, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 661, 671-74 (1975).
" See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 96, 138 (1977); LefOar, Choice-Influ-
encing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Con-
flicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
Besides the previously mentioned "most significant relationship" or "dominant
contacts" test, "comparative impairment" test and the rule of lex loci delicti, there
also exists the "choice influencing considerations" approach. Under this approach the
court considers: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and inter-
national order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's
governmental interests; and (5) application of the rule of law. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict
of Laws § 105 (1979).
56 See, e.g., Tydings, supra note 52, for a discussion of the Boston Harbor crash
cases in which plaintiffs suing under a Massachusetts wrongful death statute were
limited to recoveries of $20,000 while plaintiffs suing under a Pennsylvania statutue
recovered up to $180,000. Id. at 302-06.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." Actions also may be trans-
ferred to a single federal court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). See
supra note 5.
Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Litigation: A Judicial
Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 231, 236-37 (1976).
" Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). See supra note 8.
"0 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642 (1964). The Court stated that a transfer
is merely a "change of courtrooms." Id.
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damages."
The Seventh Circuit in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines12
avoided analysis of a complicated conflict of laws problem and
the risk of inconsistent results, by applying federal common
law. The case arose out of a collision between a jet airliner
and a small aircraft. Actions were instituted on behalf of
eighty-one of the decedents against five different defendants
in various federal district courts.'s The cases were consoli-
dated and transferred to the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana.4 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was con-
fronted with the issue of what law to apply to the two defen-
dants who had settled out of court and who subsequently
sought contribution and indemnity from two codefendants."
The court justified the application of federal common law by
stating:
The basis for imposing a federal law of contribution and in-
demnity is what we perceive to be the predominant, indeed al-
most exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating
the affairs of the nation's airways. Moreover, the imposition of
a federal rule of contribution and indemnity serves a second
purpose of eliminating inconsistency of result .... Given the
prevailing federal interest in uniform air law regulation, we
deem it desirable that a federal rule of contribution and in-
demnity be applied. 6
Some commentators have advocated the Kohr approach as
the best means of overcoming the choice-of-law problems
presented in aviation disaster litigation. The United States
" Application of different substantive laws and the unequal recoveries that result
are not unlikely, considering that a substantial number of states still follow lex loci
delicti. The rule of lex loci delicti will often cause the courts to apply different sub-
stantive law than would be applied under the modern conflict approaches. Kreindler
states that, as of the beginning of 1981, twenty-four states still followed the lex loci
delicti rule. KREINDLER, supra note 15, § 2.03, at 25.
" 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
504 F.2d at 401.
, In re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (1970).
" 504 F.2d. at 402-03.
I d. at 403.
, See, e.g., Keefe & DeValerio, Dallas, Dred Scott and Eyrie Erie, 38 J. AIR L. &
COM. 107 (1972); Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster
Litigation: A Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 231, 253-57
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Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the courts are not
free to depart from the application of state law in air crash
cases. In Miree v. DeKalb County's survivors of deceased pas-
sengers brought an action for breach of a Federal Aviation
Administration contract. The Supreme Court held that, even
though the United States had a substantial interest in regu-
lating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety, federal
common law was not applicable to the question before them.
Another approach to overcoming the problems presented by
air crash litigation is through Congressional action. In 1968
and 1969, the "Holtzoff Bill" and the "Tydings Bill""0 pro-
posed the establishment of exclusive federal court jurisdiction
in air crash cases.7 The conflict of laws problems would be
eliminated by the provision of a uniform body of federal law."'
Those in favor of legislative action argue that the federal in-
terest in, and control over, aviation activity is so strong that
liability in tort should also be governed by federal law. The
Tydings Bill was the subject of substantial hearings74 but died
in committee, after Senator Tydings failed to gain re-election.
A similar bill, providing for a federal cause of action and fed-
eral court procedures for aviation activity was introduced in
(1976).
" 433 U.S. 25 (1977). See also Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249, 273-74 (1972). The petitioners in Executive Jet invoked federal admiralty
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) to bring a suit for damages resulting from the
crash of their aircraft in the navigable waters of Lake Erie. The Court refused to
apply federal admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 273-74. See also Bowen v. United States,
570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the court discussed Miree, Executive Jet, and
Kohr and held that the law referred to in the Federal Tort Claims Act is state law.
Id. at 1316-17. See also Note, 44 J. Am L. & CoM. 635, 640-43 (1979).
6, S. 3305 & S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.§ 1 (1968).
70 S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2751(a) (1969).
71 S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., 115 CoNe. REc. 3111 (1969); S. 3305 & S. 3306, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. Rcc. 9432 (1968).
72 Senator Tydings stated, "[t]he best way to ensure a uniform and expeditious
result would be to consolidate all cases arising from a single accident for pfetrial pur-
poses and also for trial of the common question of liability, applying a single body of
law." Tydings, supra note 51, at 307.
73 Id. at 308-09.
74 Hearings on Bill to Improve the Judicial Machinery by Providing for Federal
Jurisdiction and a Body of Uniform Federal Law for cases Arising Out of Aviation
and Space Activities Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Ses. §§ 204-241 (1969).
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the House by Representative George Danielson of California
in 1978.1' This bill remains in the House Judicial Committee.
II. ANALYSIS
The availability of federal common law or the existence of a
federal statute applicable to aircraft disasters would have
greatly eased the difficulty faced by the court in In Re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois. The applications of
federal common law is apparently not acceptable, however,
and no federal statute exists concerning aviation disasters;
therefore, the Chicago court had a difficult choice-of-law ques-
tion to decide. The court had to consider the choice-of-law
rules of six different states76 and the substantive law of seven
states." The Seventh Circuit was asked to rule on a lower
court decision which had found that punitive damages were
available against MDC but not against American for all but
those plaintiffs who had filed their actions in Puerto Rico.
The district court held that the plaintiffs filing in Puerto Rico
could not recover punitive damages against either defen-
dant.7s The Seventh Circuit undertook the task of reaching a
consistent decision among both the plaintiffs and defendants
regarding the motions to strike the punitive damages claims.
The court analyzed each state's position on whether puni-
tive damages should be allowed in wrongful death actions, and
found that Illinois, the place of the injury, did not allow puni-
7' H.R. 10917, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. RE C. 3382 (1978).
7' In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1981).
The court considered the choice-of-law rules of Illinois, California, New York, Michi-
gan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. Each of these were states where actions were filed. Id.
77 Id. The court considered the substantive law of Illinois, Missouri, California,
New York, Texas, Oklahoma, and Hawaii. Id
78 Because Puerto Rico applied the rule of lex loci delicti and the law of the place
of the injury did not allow punitive damages, plaintiffs filing in Puerto Rico were to
be denied recovery of punitive damages against both defendants.
The district court expressed its regret with the result by stating:
The inconsistency of finding punitive damages available against one
defendant and not the other is compelled by differences in various
states' conflict of law and punitive damages rules and reflects the
problems inherent in application of state law to activities of national
scope, such as those of the airline industry.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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tive damages. The court further found that the laws of the
states with interests in MDC were in conflict, in that one state
allowed punitive damages and one state did not. The court
found the same conflict with regard to the laws of the states
with interests in American. Specifically, the court determined
that Missouri, MDC's principal place of business, and New
York, American's principal place of businesse7 9 both allowed
punitive damages. 80 California, the place of MDC's conduct,
and Oklahoma, the place of American's conduct, did not allow
punitive damages. After announcing that the court would ex-
amine the choice-of-law rules precisely with regard to each
state's interest in the issue of punitive damages,81 the Seventh
Circuit began its analysis of the actual conflict of laws issues.
Beginning with the actions filed in Illinois, the court found
that Illinois adhered to the "most significant relationship"
test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 2 The
court pointed out that the contacts to be taken into account
under this test were: (1) the place of the injury; (2) the place
of misconduct; (3) the domicile and place of business of the
parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the
parties is centered.88 The court stated that it was unclear
whether the relationship of the parties was "centered" in Illi-
nois, the place of departure, or California, the place of desti-
7' Plaintiffs contended that Texas should be considered American's principal place
of business since it was American's principal place of business at the time of trial.
The court found that New York was American's principal place of business on the
date of the crash and as such it was the state to be considered in a conflict of laws
analysis. 644 F.2d at 616-20.
I0 d. at 608.
61 Id. at 611. The court stated:
Critical to conflicts analysis is the notion that we must examine the
choice-of-law rules not with regard to various states' interests in gen-
eral, but precisely, with regard to each state's interest in the specific
question of punitive damages. Thus, we approve the concept of 'depe-
cage': the process of applying rules of different states on the basis of
the precise issue involved.
Id. Reese defines depecage as "the process of applying the rules of different states to
determine different issues in the same case." Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenome-
non in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58, 75 (1972).
81 644 F.2d at 611. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
63 644 F.2d. at 612. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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nation.84 The court also found that the domicile of the plain-
tiffs had no interest in the issue of punitive damages.88 This
determination left for consideration the interests of the state
where the alleged misconduct occurred, the state of the princi-
pal place of business, and the state where the injury occurred.
The court explained that states award punitive damages to
deter wrongful conduct, or disallow punitive damages to pro-
tect the economic well-being of corporations in their state.86
The court concluded that California, the place of MDC's con-
duct in the manufacture and design of the DC-10, and New
York, American's principal place of business, had obvious in-
terests in protecting businesses within their borders by
prohibiting awards of punitive damages. These states derived
"substantial sales and income taxes, as well as other revenues,
directly and indirectly from a corporation's activities within
the state. '87 The court noted that, by protecting these corpo-
rations, states enhance their own economic well being.88 The
court also pointed out that a state's favorable position on pu-
nitive damages may be a factor in a corporation's decision to
move to the state.89
The court found that the states allowing punitive damages
had strong interests in preventing future misconduct. By pun-
ishing the defendants, these states could deter wrongful con-
duct in the design, the manufacture and the maintenance of
airplanes.90 The court rejected MDC's argument that the state
of a corporations's principal place of business had no interest
in punishing its own corporate domiciliary. 1 Judge Sprecher
" 644 F.2d at 612.
" Id. at 612-13.
" Id. at 613. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was in agreement with the
district court regarding the purpose for punitive damages. The district court relied on
the cases of Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
and Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 459 F. Supp. 953
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"' 644 F.2d at 614.
Id. Corporations are economically beneficial to a state because they provide jobs
and give the state a larger tax base.
" 644 F.2d at 614.
Id. at 613.
I /d.
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stated that this view would "gut the very concept of corporate
accountability. ' 92 The court explained further that if all
courts looked solely to the place of conduct, corporations
could attempt to structure major operating, manufacturing
and design decisions so that a court would not find that the
conduct occurred in a punitive damages state.98 The court
concluded that the state of the principal place of business and
the state of the defendants' misconduct had strong interests
in the issue of punitive damages, but that the court was una-
ble to say which one had a stronger interest than the other."
The court reached a similar conclusion in its analysis of the
actions filed in California. Following California's "comparative
impairment"9 5 approach, the court had to decide which state's
interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied."
In making this decision, the court examined two factors to de-
termine the relative commitment of each state to the law in-
volved. These factors were: "(1) the current status of a statute
and the intensity of interest with which it is held; and (2) the
'comparative pertinence' of the statute: the 'fit' between the
purpose of the legislature and the situation in the case at
hand. . . . "9 The court found that the states of MDC's and
American's principal places of business and the states of their
misconduct all had strong current interests in their punitive
damage laws, and that there was a good "fit" between the pur-
pose of each law and the facts of the case.9 8 The court could
not say, however, that one state's interest would be more im-
02 Id. Judge Cudahy pointed out a weakness in this reasoning in his concurrence, in
which he stated that "[tihe finding of such a Missouri interest may impute an un-
usual level or [sic] altruism to Missouri policy and may overstate the commitment of
Missouri (or any other state) to 'corporate accountability' in circumstances where
both the misconduct and the injuries took place outside the borders of the domicili-
ary state." 644 F.2d at 633 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
" 644 F.2d at 613-14.
Id. at 615, 621.
95 Id. at 621.
'" Id. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
"7 644 F.2d at 622. The court extracted this rule from Offshore Rental Co. v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 166-67, 583 P.2d 721, 727, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873
(1978).
11 644 F.2d at 623, 625, 627-28.
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paired than the other's if its law was not applied."
The district court also had found that the states of the
principal places of business and the places of misconduct both
had strong interests in the application of their own law. 00 The
lower court resolved this conflict by applying the law of the
principal place of business, stating: "[r]esponsibility for corpo-
rate conduct should be uniform regardless of where the opera-
tion took place." 101 The court's reasoning was that application
of the law of the place of misconduct would involve an exten-
sive examination of the particular employees and operations
involved, and a determination of the location of employees or
corporate officers ultimately responsible for the type of con-
duct in question. 02 This kind of analysis, the lower court de-
cided, would detract from the certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result.103 The Seventh Circuit Court rejected
this lower court rule because it found that the district court
had looked only at the purpose behind a state's decision to
allow punitive damages and had failed to consider the reason
behind a state's decision not to allow punitive damages.104
The court of appeals resolved what it called a "total and
genuine conflict"'1 8 between the laws of the principal place of
business and the place of misconduct by turning to the law of
Illinois, the place of the injury.'06 Accordingly, it granted both
American's and MDC's motion to strike punitive damage
claims. 10 7 No plaintiff in any jurisdiction would be allowed to
recover punitive damages.10 8 The justification for application
" Id. at 625, 628.
100 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-51 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
101 Id. at 1049-50.
"' Id. at 1050.
103 Id.
'0" 644 F.2d at 615.
106 Id.
104 Id.
10 Id. at 633.
'08 The Court found that the New York test was the functional equivalent of the
Restatement (Second) test used by Illinois. Thus, the conflict analysis with regard to
New York was the same as that applied to Illinois. Id. at 629. Recent Michigan deci-
sions indicated Michigan would also follow the "most significant relationship" test.
The court stated that if this test did not resolve the question, Michigan courts would
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of Illinois law was that, although the interests of Illinois were
inferior to those of the other states considered, 10 9 it neverthe-
less had strong interests.1 0 The court listed Illinois' interests
as encompassing: (1) the shock wave suffered and the ex-
penses incurred by the state of Illinois on account of the
crash; (2) the fact that, with regard to the actions filed in Illi-
nois, all but two of the decedents resided there; and (3) the
fact that Illinois, as home of one of the world's busiest air-
ports, had a strong interest in encouraging air transportation
companies to do business within the state."'
The court stated that its rule was a "principled means of
decision" 1 2 that lent itself to "certainty, predictability, uni-
formity of result, and ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied." ' " Recognizing the problems
involved in resolving conflict of laws issues in airplane
crashes, " " the court concluded its opinion with a plea to Con-
gress for the passage of a uniform federal law to govern tort
liability. Judge Sprecher stated:
Along with the district court, we conclude that it is clearly in
the interests of passengers, airline corporations, airplane manu-
facturers, and state and federal governments, that airline tort
liability be regulated by federal law. Of course, we are well
aware of the fact that it is up to Congress, and not the courts,
to create the needed uniform law. 15
turn to the law of the place of the injury, relying on their precedents of following the
lex loci delicti rule. Id. at 630. Puerto Rico follows lex loci delicti; therefore, it also
would apply the law of Illinois. Id. at 630. The court was unable to determine the
choice-of-law rule of Hawaii, and concluded that, in this situation, it should presume
that the forum would apply its own law. Finding that Hawaii law does not authorize
punitive damages, the court granted the motions to strike the Hawaiian punitive
damages claims against both defendants. Id. at 630-32.
100 Id. at 615. The other states considered were Missouri, California, New York and
Oklahoma. Id. at 610-20.
,"0 Id. at 615.
I Id.
.. Id. at 616.
13 Id. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) lists these fac-
tors as relevant to the choice of the applicable rule. See supra note 36.
11 644 F.2d at 632-33.
115 Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
In examining the states' interests in the issue of punitive
damages in the Chicago case,116 it seems that Illinois is no
more than the fortuitous place of the injury. The expenses
that Illinois incurred in rescue operations, clean-up opera-
tions, notifying next-of-kin and other procedures related to
the crash were no greater than the expenses any other state
would have incurred had the crash taken place within its
boundaries. Illinois law does not allow punitive damages, so
Illinois had no interest in the application of its law for the
purpose of deterring air crashes.
The fact that a large number of the decedents resided in
Illinois does not appear to add much to Illinois' interest in the
issue of punitive damages. The court explained in an earlier
part of its opinion:
The domiciliary states do not have an interest in disallowing
punitive damages because the decision to disallow such dam-
ages is obviously designed to protect the interest of the resi-
dent defendants, not to effectuate the interest of the domicili-
ary states in the welfare of plaintiffs. E.g., Hurtado v. Superior
Court.'17
The fact that Illinois is the home of O'Hare International
Airport, one of the world's busiest airports, also does not seem
to be a strong indication of Illinois' interest in the application
of its law regarding punitive damages. The court claimed that
the presence of the large airport indicated that Illinois had a
strong interest in encouraging air transportation corporations
to do business within the state. 18 Illinois does not seem to
have an interest in protecting MDC, the manufacturer, how-
ever, because MDC is headquartered in Missouri and per-
formed its alleged misconduct in California. In addition, an
airline's decision to schedule flights to a .particular city proba-
bly would not be affected significantly by that state's punitive
See supra note 81.
i17 644 F.2d at 612.
118 Id. at 615.
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damages rule."' In deciding whether to fly to and from Chi-
cago, an air carrier probably gives greater consideration to the
geographic location of the city and the customer demand for
flights. The legislative purpose behind Illinois' punitive dam-
ages statute does not seem to "fit""20 the facts of this case.
The court claims that its analysis is more than just a "tabu-
lat[ion of] the states pro and con" 21 on the issue of punitive
damages. It also warns that its decision is not a return to the
mechanical, wooden law of lex loci delicti."2 Yet, even if the
argument is accepted that Illinois had a strong interest in the
application of its law, the court is still applying the law of the
state with a less significant relationship than that of the other
states considered." Illinois is the state whose interest would
be the least impaired if its law were not applied.
The apparent weaknesses in the court's reasoning are actu-
ally an indication of the Seventh Circuit's ingenuity in reach-
ing an equitable result. In applying the law of Illinois, the
court of appeals was able to avoid the inequity of allowing pu-
nitive damage claims against one defendant and not against
the other. The court also avoided the situation in which some
plaintiffs would be able to recover punitive damages and
others would not, even though their injuries were similar and
their claims arose out of the same tortious conduct.
The importance of the place of the injury rule laid down in
this case is that it will allow future courts to escape inconsis-
tent results. The reasoning behind the rule is also important
because it is an example of the difficulty modern courts face
in reaching equitable results under our current aviation acci-
"9 Texas allows punitive damages in wrongful death actions, yet Dallas-Ft.Worth
International Airport ranks fourth in the world in air carrier operations. Interview
with Jim Street, Department of Public Information of Dallas-Ft.Worth International
Airport, in Dallas, Texas (July, 1980).
120 See supra text accompanying note 97.
121 644 F.2d at 613.
"I Id. at 621.
1" Id. at 615. The court stated "[b]ecause the place of the injury is much more
fortuitous than the place of misconduct or the principal place of business, its interest
in and ability to control behavior by deterrence or punishment, or to protect defen-
dants from liability, is lower than that of the place of misconduct or principal place of
business". Id.
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dent law system. In Congress a bill that is presently before the
House Judicial Committee12 would alleviate the problems
confronting courts in air disaster cases. Passage of this bill,
which calls for a federal cause of action and federal court pro-
cedures, would provide the much needed uniformity in avia-
tion accident law. A federal statute, uniform as to liability and
damages, would enhance judicial economy and reduce the
chance of inconsistent results. Many of the problems encoun-
tered in litigating the Chicago case could be avoided if Con-
gress enacts a federal law to govern this type of action.
Chris Cage
CIVIL PROCEDURE-IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION IN
TEXAs-Article 2031b, the Texas long-arm statute, requires a
nexus between the defendant's contacts with Texas and the
plaintiff's cause of action, such that in personam jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant cannot properly be predicated
solely upon the defendant's activities within the state, absent
a showing that those activities gave rise to the cause of action
sued upon. Prejean v. Sonatrach, 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir.
1981).
In October, 1975, John Prejean and Alphonse Mouton, em-
"" See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Conflicts scholars have recognized
the need for a federal law for aviation torts. Robert Leflar stated that "[tihere are
many situations in which it does not make sense to struggle over the question of
which state's law to apply. Airborne collisions of commercial passenger planes illus-
trate the problem vividly. Midair crashes may occur close to state lines so that it is
difficult to determine where, jurisdictionally, particular events occurred, and the loca-
tion if determined may have little relevance to the interests affected by the crash.
The persons affected may be residents of 20 to 50 different states or foreign nations.
Air travel is in interstate or international commerce, and what is needed is national
law applicable to all such claims to which the laws of the United States may properly
be applied. It is a federal substantive law, not conflicts law, that is needed." Leflar,
Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 24-25 (1977).
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ployees of a Dallas engineering firm, were stationed in Algeria
for the purpose of carrying out the terms of an alleged con-
tract between their employer and Sonatrach, Inc., the Alge-
rian national oil company. While performing their duties in
this connection, the two engineers boarded an airplane alleg-
edly chartered by Sonatrach and owned by Air Algerie. The
airplane, which had been manufactured in the United States
by Beech Aircraft Corporation, crashed due to unknown
causes. The accident resulted in the deaths of Prejean and
Mouton, and their widows brought an action for wrongful
death in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of Texas.1 Named as defendants in the suit were Sonatrach,
Inc., Air Algerie and Beech Aircraft Corporation. All three de-
fendants were served with process under the Texas long-arm
statute,2 and all promptly challenged the existence of in per-
sonam jurisdiction in the Texas courts. The district court
granted each defandant's motion to dismiss.'
Prejean v. Sonatrach, 652 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1981).
2 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982). The relevant
portions of the statute read:
Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company, part-
nership, or non-resident natural person that engages in business in this
State, irrespective of any Statute or law respecting designation or
maintenance of resident agents, and does not maintain a place of regu-
lar business in this State . . . , the act or acts of engaging in such
business within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appoint-
ment by such foreign corporation, joint stock company, association,
partnership, or non-resident natural person of the Secretary of State
of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made in any
action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in this
State, wherein such corporation, joint stock company, association,
partnership, or non-resident natural person is a party or is to be made
a party.
Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts
that may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation, joint
stock company, association, partnership, or non-resident natural per-
son shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into con-
tract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in this State, or the committing of any
tort in whole or in part in this State. The act of recruiting Texas re-
sidents, directly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for em-
ployment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing business in
this State.
Id. §§ 3-4.
' 652 F.2d at 1264.
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Plaintiffs appealed the dismissals to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, urging both that long-arm jurisdiction was proper,
since the Texas statute is coextensive with the limits of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and that each defendant had suf-
ficient contacts with the state to satisfy due process require-
ments.' Defendants countered that contacts sufficient for pur-
poses of federal due process are not necessarily adequate for
purposes of the Texas statute because the statute requires
that the plaintiff's cause of action arise from the defendant's
contacts with the state. They further maintained that this re-
quirement was not met as to any of them because all of their
contacts were unrelated to the plaintiff's suit.0 In this respect,
defendants asserted, the Texas statute is more restricted in its
reach than the due process clause requires. Held, affirmed in
part: Article 2031b, the Texas long-arm statute, requires a
nexus between the defendant's contacts with Texas and the
plaintiff's cause of action, such that in personam jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant cannot properly be predicated
solely upon the defendant's activities within the state, absent
a showing that those activities gave rise to the cause of action
sued upon. Prejean v. Sonatrach, 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir.
1981).
I. DUE PROcEss LIMITATIONS
The ultimate delineation of the permissible reach of a
state's long-arm statute is drawn by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. The clause, as construed by
the United States Supreme Court, mandates that certain fair-
ness requirements be met before a defendant is haled into the
courts of a state in which he does not reside.' Assuming, how-
ever, that such conditions are met, the state is free to impose
still further constraints upon the reach of its own long-arm
jurisdiction. It may thus draft the long-arm statute so as to
4Id.
o Id.
* See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
Id. at 463,
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make its reach narrower than, or contiguous with, the require-
ments of federal due process.
Limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on
state assertions of in personam jurisdiction over non-residents
were outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington8 and its progeny. In its deci-
sion in International Shoe, the Supreme Court espoused the
now-familiar requirement that the non-resident defendant "if
he be not present within the. . . forum. . . have certain min-
imum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' "' In International Shoe the State of Washington
sought to collect unemployment taxes based on commissions
paid by the defendant firm to its Washington-based salesman.
The defendant corporation had its principal place of business
in Missouri, but its Washington salesman generated $31,000
total commissions annually.' 0 The Court was, therefore, con-
fronted with a situation in which the substantial activities of
the defendant within the forum state directly gave rise to the
plaintiff's cause of action." The Supreme Court found that
these activities of the non-resident defendant within Wash-
ington were sufficient "minimum contacts" to justify the state
court's assertion of jurisdiction."
Seven years later, the Supreme Court addressed a case in
which the defendant-corporation maintained substantial con-
tacts with the forum state, but where those contacts did not
give rise to the plaintiff's cause of action. In Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consolidated Mining Co.,', the plaintiff-shareholeder
sued to recover dividends she claimed were due her from the
company's mining operation in the Philippines. 4 She brought
suit against the defendant corporation in Ohio, where the cor-
porate president and principal stockholder conducted busi-
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
,O 326 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 320.
12 Id.
.3 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
" Id. at 439.
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ness of the corporation unrelated to the Philippines opera-
tions.15 The Supreme Court held that a non-resident
defendant constitutionally may be subjected to in personam
jurisdiction on an unrelated cause of action if its activities
within the forum state are "continuous and systematic."' 6 The
Court reasoned that there was no unfairness in subjecting a
corporation to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state in which
the corporation maintained an authorized representative.17
This fact was held to be dispositive, regardless of where the
cause of action arose.
A state court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a
non-resident was again upheld in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.l8 In McGee an out-of-state insurer sent a rein-
surance certificate to the insured in the forum state, and the
insured mailed all premiums on the policy from the forum
state. The defendant had no offices in that state, nor had it
done any other business there.19 The beneficiaries under the
policy brought suit against the insurer for wrongful refusal to
pay benefits under the policy. McGee thus represented the
situation in which the defendant's minimal contacts with the
forum state gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action. The
Court found these minimal contacts sufficient for purposes of
due process and agreed with the state's assertion of
jurisdiction2 0
In Hanson v. Denckla' the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a state court's asserted jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation, when the cause of action sued upon did not arise
out of the foreign corporation's minimal contacts with the fo-
rum state. The Florida plaintiffs in Hanson sued a Delaware
trustee for a declaratory judgment that the proceeds from the
trust should pass to them.22 The trust had been created by the
' Id. at 438.
' Id. at 445.
I ld. at 444.
" 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
I ld. at 221-222.
'o Id. at 223.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 238.
CASE NOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
plaintiff's mother in Pennsylvania, and the trustee was a Del-
aware bank that had few contacts with, Florida. 8 It was
against this setting that the Supreme Court set forth its
widely quoted "purposeful availment" test, saying that "[t]he
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of con-
tact with the forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State .... "2 Finding that the defendant in Hanson
had not by its minimal activities in the forum state "pur-
posely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, ' 5 the Supreme Court, for the first
time since its decision in International Shoe, held an asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction unconstitutional."
Four factual paradigms emerge from the Supreme Court de-
cisions which illustrate the extent of the defendant's contacts
and the origin of the cause of action. In the first of these para-
digms, formulated in International Shoe, the non-resident's
substantial activities in the forum gave rise to the plaintiff's
cause of action.27 In the second paradigm the cause of action
was unrelated to the defendant's substantial contacts with the
forum.28 In the third, the cause of action arose out of the de-
fendant's casual or slight activities within the forum state. 9
Finally, in the fourth paradigm, the plaintiff's cause of action
arose apart from the defendant's insubstantial forum con-
tacts.30 In only the last of these situations was the assertion of
jurisdiction found to be violative of due process. Nevertheless,
23 Id.
" Id. at 253. See, e.g., Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1978); Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1268 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Barnstone v.
Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
KND Corp., 83 F.R.D. 556, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
25 357 U.S. at 253.
26 Id. at 251.
2, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
10 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
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the Supreme Court has never required that a nexus exist be-
tween the cause of action and the defendant's forum contacts.
To the contrary, the Perkins decision disavows such a require-
ment by allowing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident on a cause of action unrelated to the forum
contacts.
II. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
While federal due process requirements define the outer-
most boundaries of state long-arm jurisdiction, a particular
state's long-arm statute may itself impose further constraints
upon the courts in the exercise of jurisdiction over non-re-
sidents.8 1 The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins32 dic-
tates that the construction of state statutes be left to the state
courts, so that federal courts sitting in a particular state must
give the statute the same construction as would that state's
highest court.8  Because the statute conferring jurisdiction
may be more restricted in its reach than required by due pro-
cess, the federal court, prior to applying the principles of the
Supreme Court's minimum contacts decisions, must examine
the long-arm statute in light of the state courts' decisions con-
struing it.84 If the statute is construed to confer jurisdiction
upon the courts of a particular state in a given case, the fed-
eral court must then proceed to inquire whether the grant of
31 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For another ex-
ample of Supreme Court invalidation of a state's asserted jurisdiction over a non-
resident, see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), in which the Court refused
to allow the mother of a minor child, residing with her mother in California, to bring
an in personam action against the child's father, who lived in New York.
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33 See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1974).
i See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970) (exer-
cise of jurisdiction by Texas over a non-resident television manufacturer, which had
sold to retailers with the knowledge that a portion of its products would be shipped
directly to Texas, was not violative of due process of law); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heis-
dorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966) (Fifth Circuit allowed assertion of
jurisdiction over a Washington corporation which had contracted with several Texas
hatcheries for the sale and lease of certain breeding stock, reserving supervisory
rights to exploit the economic potential of the Texas market and occasionally sending
field representatives into Texas); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90
(S.D. Tex. 1963) (court allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign manufac-
turer of a valve that was shipped to Texas where it caused a fatal injury).
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jurisdiction is also constitutional."
A. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.
The Texas Supreme Court's first occasion to address the is-
sue of state long-arm jurisdiction was in the 1966 case of
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 6 In O'Brien, the court had to decide
whether to give full faith and credit to an Illinois judgment,
and whether the Illinois court had jurisdiction over the Texas
corporation against whom it had rendered a default judgment.
In assessing the propriety of the Illinois court's assertion of
jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court noted that "[t]he va-
lidity of the Illinois judgment is controlled by the law of Illi-
nois but must satisfy the due process clause. '3 7 After quoting
from the relevant portions of the Illinois long-arm statute,88
the court acknowledged that "Illinois has repeatedly held that
the quoted sections reflect a purpose to assert jurisdiction
over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the
due process clause.'89
The O'Brien court proceeded to analyze due process princi-
ples and concluded with a quote from Tyee Construction Co.
v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., ° a Washington Supreme Court
case that purported to set forth the "three basic factors which
should coincide if jurisdiction [over the non-resident] is to be
entertained.""1 Those factors, as outlined by the Washington
Court, were as follows:
(1) The non-resident defendant or foreign corporation must
purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in
the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be
connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assump-
35 See Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1966). See also Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1969).
3- 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
37 id. at 341.
"' The statute under consideration was substantially similar to the Texas long-arm
statute in that it required the cause of action to arise out of the business done within
the state. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1960) (amended 1977).
39 399 S.W.2d at 341.
' 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
4 Id. at 251.
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tion of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration
being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in
the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the
benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded
the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.""
These factors, while they have been widely cited in Texas by
both state and federal courts,' 8 are of dubious precedential
value for purposes of defining Texas long-arm jurisdiction.
The obvious limitation is that the O'Brien court was not con-
struing Article 2031b, but rather, was engaging in a discussion
of due process limits in the context of the Illinois long-arm
statute.44
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was careful to make this
distinction in Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian"8 and thereby rid
itself of the O'Brien factor requiring a nexus between the
cause of action and the forum contacts." In Eyerly, the non-
resident defendant manufactured a carnival ride upon which
the plaintiff's daughter was injured in Texas.4 The ride was
manufactured in Oregon, sold to a Chicago Company, and
then sold to a North Dakota Company that toured with it
throughout the United States, and eventually brought it to
Texas.48 The defendant had substantial contacts with Texas
through other business transactions.4 9 The court found that
42 Id.
,3 See, e.g., Barnstone v. Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978);
Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939
(1977); Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Helicopteros
Nationales De Columbia v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Milman Beef
Co., 530 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
See McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
" 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
, See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
4 414 F.2d at 592.
4' Id. at 593.
19 Id. at 594. The defendant's business transactions within the state included sales
and deliveries of amusement devices and parts in the state, the extension of credit in
the state, the retention of liens on items sold within the state, the filing of such liens
with state authorities, the servicing of machinery within the state, and the solicitation
of business in the state. Id.
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the defendant corporation purposefully conducted business
activities in Texas but that the plaintiff's cause of action had
not arisen out of those contacts."0
The Fifth Circuit found the question to be whether the un-
related business contacts, plus the introduction of the ride
into interstate commerce were sufficient to support Texas in
personam jurisdiction over Eyerly Aircraft.6 1 In holding the
contacts sufficient, the court distinguished O'Brien on three
grounds. First, the court explained that O'Brien was a con-
struction of the Illinois long-arm statute and not of Article
2031b.2 Secondly, it stated that the three factors from the
Washington decison in Tyee were set forth in the context of
due process limitations on long-arm service of process and
were not intended to represent statutory limits.53 Finally, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Tyee case was implicitly refer-
ring to the situation in which a non-resident defendant is sued
in one state for a tort committed in a third state, and this
situation was not the case in Eyerly."I Thus, having dimin-
ished the value of the O'Brien decision as precedent, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion over the ride manufacturer was proper.
The Fifth Circuit again circumvented the O'Brien factor,
requiring a nexus between the cause of action and the defen-
dant's forum contacts, in Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v.
Gardiner.55 In Jetco, the defendant's contacts with the forum
state were "admittedly neither as 'substantial' nor as 'continu-
ous' as those of the defendants in Eyerly,"' ' 5 and, in addition,
the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise from those con-
tacts.57 Nonetheless, the court held that the defendant's unre-
lated contacts were sufficient to sustain the district court's ex-
1O Id. at 595.
61 Id.
" Id. at 599 n.12. In O'Brien, the Texas Supreme Court stated that it was "the
Illinois law and not the Texas law that [was on] point." O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399
S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. 1966).
" 414 F.2d at 599-600 n.12.
54 Id.
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ercise of in personam jurisdiction. 8 The court cited Eyerly
for the proposition that:
When a nonresident defendant introduces a product into inter-
state commerce under circumstances that make it reasonable
to expect that the product may enter the forum state, the fo-
rum may assert jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit arising
out of injury caused by the product in the forum, if the defen-
dant's other activities within the forum, even though wholly
unrelated to the suit, satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement.59
Under this "foreseeable effects" theory it became apparent
that a nexus was not required.
The Fifth Circuit's second rationale in Jetco, which is often
reiterated in federal cases,60 was to the effect that Article
2031b represents a legislative effort to authorize in personam
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by federal due process."'
The Fifth Circuit restated this proposition in Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau.'2 In defining what it believed due pro-
cess would "permit," the Cousteau court enunciated a dual
test." First, the court required that "there be some minimum
contact with the state that results from an affirmative act of
11 Id. at 1234.
89 Id.
" See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974);
Gurley v. Lindsley, 459 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1972) (Fifth Circuit allowed a Texas plain-
tiff to bring an action for an accounting of past oil royalties from oil production due
under a lease and to recover interest in the lands by reason of the claimed beneficial
interest of plaintiff's predecessor); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms,
357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
01 473 F.2d at 1234. See Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961), in which the court stated that, "[iut seems likely that, as is
true for similar legislation in many other states,. . . the Texas purpose was to exploit
to the maximum the fullest permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints."
Id. at 73-74. See generally Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, the
Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdic-
tion in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEx. L. Rav. 279 (1964).
62 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in Cousteau stated, "Article 2031b repre-
sents an effort by Texas to reach as far as federal constitutional requirements for due
process will permit in exercising jurisdiction over the persons of non-resident defen-
dants." Id. at 491.
o' Id. at 494.
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the defendant. 6 4 Second, it required that it "be fair and rea-
sonable to require the defendant to come into the state and
defend the action. '6 5 The federal court ignored the Obrien
nexus requirement in formulating this test.
The Fifth Circuit, nonetheless, resurrected the O'Brien test
in Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp.," and the court held that the
nexus requirement of that test had been satisfied. The plain-
tiff in Wilkerson was a Texas horse-trainer who brought suit
against the operator of a New Mexico race-track that was lo-
cated just across the boarder from El Paso, Texas." The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's refusal to furnish the
plaintiff with stalls at the track constituted a tort under New
Mexico law."8 In addressing the jurisdictional question, the
Fifth Circuit observed that the race-track was strategically
placed at the Texas border, and that the defendant actively
solicited Texas business.6 The court held that these "broad-
based" activities gave rise to the asserted cause of action, and
thus fulfilled the O'Brien requirement of a nexus between the
cause of action and the forum contacts."0 The court reasoned
that "[b]ecause [the defendant] projected itself into Texas
daily, and because its very reason for being was to deal con-
stantly and mostly with customers from the forum state, it is
not appropriate that Wilkerson demonstrate some specific lo-
cal act which created the cause of action. '7 1
The decisions following O'Brien indicate the Fifth Circuit's
ambivalence as to whether the O'Brien criteria remained via-
ble. On the one hand, the court devised the "foreseeable ef-
fects" theory on the premise that under this doctrine it was
unnecessary for the cause of action to arise from the forum
contacts. On the other hand, in the Wilkerson case the Fifth
4 Id.
65 Id.
554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977).
" Id. at 746-47.
" Id. at 747.
69 Id. at 748.
" Id. at 749.
71 Id. The court went on to address the issue of whether due process required that
the cause of action arise from the forum contacts, and concluded that it did not. Id.
at 749-50.
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Circuit was careful to apply the O'Brien test and to explain
how the defendant's contacts with Texas related to the plain-
tiff's cause of action. In other cases, the court has simply dis-
tinguished the O'Brien decision on the ground that it was not
a construction of the Texas long-arm statute, and, therefore,
was not binding on the federal courts in Texas.
B. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decison in Wilkerson, the
Texas Supreme Court was again confronted with a question of
the limits of state long-arm jurisdiction, this time in the con-
text of Article 2031b. In U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 7
the plaintiff, U-Anchor, sued Burt, an Oklahoma resident, for
breach of contract. The contract in question was solicited by
U-Anchor and negotiated in Oklahoma.73 It called for the
plaintiff to place highway advertising displays for thirty-six
months throughout Oklahoma on Burt's behalf.7 ' The non-
resident defendant's only contact with Texas was its mailing
of the monthly payments called for under the contract to U-
Anchor's Texas office.75 The Texas Supreme Court found that
these contacts with the state "fell short of the requirements of
due process. ' '1 6
In addressing the propriety of the assertion of personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant, the court's analysis was remi-
niscent of its approach in O'Brien. The court initially quoted
the relevant statutory provisions, 78 and then stated that "Arti-
cle 2031b reaches as far as the federal constitutional require-
ments of due process will permit . . . [i]t is limited only by
the United States Constitution. ' 09 In making this observation,
the Texas Supreme Court noted that this construction was
7- 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).




77 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 2.
79 553 S.W.2d at 762.
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the one given the statute by the federal courts.80 The court
deemed this interpretation proper since it "allow[ed] the
court to focus on the constitutional limitations of due process
rather than to engage in technical and abstruse attempts to
consistently define 'doing business' "I'
The court, after defining the reach of the Texas long-arm
statute to the limits of due process, turned to a consideration
of those limits. It first discussed the Cousteau two-part test,8"
but then quoted from O'Brien, citing the three requisite ele-
ments for in personam jurisdiction over non-residents.88 With
regard to the O'Brien factor requiring a nexus between the
cause of action and the forum contacts, the court stated that
"[i]t is evident that U-Anchor's cause of action against Burt is
connected with the contractual obligation assumed by Burt
and partially performable in Texas." 4 Nevertheless, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the first element, which re-
quired the defendant to "purposefully do some act or consum-
mate some transaction in the forum state," 88 had not been ful-
filled.86 The court finally concluded that defendant Burt's
contacts with Texas were too "minimal and fortuitous" to sus-
tain jurisdiction."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, with the Texas Su-
preme Court's construction of Article 2031b before it as prece-
dent, again addressed the issue of the extent of Texas long-
arm jurisdiction in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell."
The specific question was whether due process would permit a
Texas court to exercise jurisdiction over an Idaho official,
charged under Idaho law with preventing a Texas-based cor-
poration, from proceeding with the take-over of an Idaho-
based corporation. The Fifth Circuit's analysis commenced
so See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
e' 553 S.W.2d at 762.
,' See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
88 553 S.W.2d at 762.
S4Id.
8 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
" 553. S.W.2d at 763.
87 Id. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
- 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub noma., Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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with the proposition that Article 2031b reached to the limits
of due process, citing U-Anchor and Cousteau" as authority
for this conclusion. The court responded to the defendant's
argument that jurisdiction was improper because all of his ac-
tivity had taken place in Idaho, by concluding that
" '[m]inimum contacts' .. need not arise from actual physi-
cal activity in the forum state; activities in other forums with
foreseeable effects in the forum state will suffice." 9 The
precedents cited for the "foreseeable effects" doctrine were
the Fifth Circuit's pre-U-Anchor decisions in Cousteau and
Eyerly," indicating that the doctrine survived the Texas Su-
preme Court's U-Anchor opinion, despite the fact that the
"foreseeable effects" doctrine disavowed a nexus requirement.
The foreseeable effects doctrine was also relied upon by the
Fifth Circuit in a suit under the federal antitrust laws in
Black v. Acme Markets, Inc.9 The plaintiffs, Texas cattle
producers and feeders, brought suit in Texas against several
super-market chains, alleging antitrust violations.93 The trial
court granted a motion to dismiss as to one defendant, a Mas-
sachusetts corporation, stating that there was no proof by the
plaintiff that the defendant's conspiracy to depress beef prices
caused injury to the plaintiff's business in Texas." The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,95 finding that the effects of
the defendant's conspiracy were produced in Texas and that
this, coupled with the defendant's substantial business con-
tacts in Texas, was sufficient for in personam jurisdiction in
Texas."
89 577 F.2d at 1266.
90 Id. at 1266-67.
" See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
" 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 682.
SId.
" Id. at 686.
Id. at 685-86. The defendant's contacts with Texas consisted of purchasing alu-
minum foil from Carrollton, salad oil from Dallas, and turkeys from Lampassas, for
an aggregate price of some $1.5 million. In reversing the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit
stated that it was certain that Texas courts would construe the statute to reach an
out-of-state corporation that had purchased products worth a total of $1.5 million
from Texas in a single year, where the corporation was alleged to have engaged in a
conspiracy whose effects would almost certainly be felt in Texas. Id. at 685.
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In Walker v. Newgent,"7 however, the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly required a nexus between the cause of action and the
forum contacts in the context of a contract case. Walker in-
volved the question of whether a United States citizen could
sue General Motors and its subsidiary, Opel, in Texas for in-
juries arising out of a car accident in Germany. Opel, the
manufacturer, was a German corporation with "no assets, of-
fice, agents [or] employees in Texas." e Although Opel did sell
cars to a division of General Motors in Texas, the car in ques-
tion was a model not manufactured for export." Because the
automobile was designed and manufactured in Germany and
the accident occurred in Germany, the court held that a tort
was not committed in whole or in part within the state, and
thus the tort provision of the Texas long-arm statute was
inapplicable. 100
Turning to the contract provision of Article 2031b, the Fifth
Circuit found it likewise inapplicable. The court explained
that in order for that provision to govern, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that "(1) a contract to be performed in whole or
in part within Texas existed between itself and [the defen-
dant] and (2) the present suit arose out of that contractual
arrangement. '" 101 Finding no contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant, the court held that Opel was not amenable
to jurisdiction in Texas.10'
Against this dichotomy in the Fifth Circuit decisions con-
cerning whether and in what circumstances a nexus was re-
quired by the statute, as this requirement was construed in U-
Anchor, the lower federal courts attempted to distinguish the
-7 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 166.
" Id. See supra note 2.
100 Id. at 166. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir.
1974).
101 583 F.2d at 166 (emphasis added) (quoting Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cous-
teau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974)).
1o 583 F.2d at 166. The court intimated, however, that jurisdiction would have
been upheld had the plaintiff succeeded in showing that an agency relationship ex-
isted between General Motors and Opel, thus qualifying Opel as "doing business"
within Texas. Id. at 167.
1982]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
U-Anchor decision. In Navarro v. Sedco, Inc.,03 the federal
District Court for the Southern District of Texas addressed a
case factually similar to the principal case. The plaintiffs were
the personal representatives of several Spanish citizens who
were killed in a helicopter crash that occurred while they were
working on a drilling rig off the West African coast. 104 The
plaintiff predicated in personam jurisdiction over the defen-
dant, a Canadian helicopter service, upon the defendant's sub-
stantial activities in Texas. 10' These contacts included the
purchasing of goods and services from U.S. companies and the
transaction of business with five Texas corporations.0 " In re-
sponse to the defendant's jurisdictional challenge, the district
court stated that it found "no merit in defendant's contention
that, in order to be amenable to service under article 2031b,
plaintiff's cause of action must arise directly out of defen-
dant's contacts with Texas. 10 7
The court went on to explain that both the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court had con-
strued the long-arm statute as "going to the limits of due pro-
cess." 0 8 Also, in the language of the district court, "the due
process clause has never been interpreted as requiring in all
cases that the plaintiff's cause of action arise directly from the
defendant's contacts with the forum."10 9 In support of this
contention the court cited the Eyerly, Black and Wilkerson
opinions as examples of the Fifth Circuit's reliance upon unre-
lated contacts to sustain in personam jurisdiction.1 0
449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See Long v. Vessel "Miss Ida Ann," 490 F.
Supp. 210 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Edwards v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp., 449 F. Supp.
1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
10, 449 F. Supp. at 1357.
108 Id. at 1357-59.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1359-60.
18 Id. at 1360 (citing Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1974); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978)).
109 Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)) Accord, Bland v.
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
"1 449 F. Supp. at 1360. But see, Gutierrez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 484 F. Supp.
241 (S.D. Tex. 1979), in which the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
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Moreover, the district court in Sedco found that the Fifth
Circuit in Eyerly had rejected the contention that O'Brien v.
Lanpar Co., the origin of the nexus requirement, was a con-
struction of Article 2031b. In a footnote to its opinion the
court observed that the nexus language in the O'Brien and U-
Anchor opinions appeared in the context of due process limi-
tations and not in the context of Article 2031b require-
ments.111 The court therefore concluded that it was "not
bound to follow Texas' interpretations of the due process
clause."11'
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas in
Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra"3s adopted a similar rationale
when confronted with the question of "how the Texas Su-
preme Court would construe article 2031b."' I  The court
noted that the Texas Supreme Court in U-Anchor cited both
federal and state precedent and expressly followed its own de-
cision in O'Brien."5 The district court did not believe, how-
ever, that the O'Brien test was intended as the "exclusive de-
terminant of due process" under Article 2031b.1" To the
defendant's argument that the O'Brien nexus factor referred
to the language of the statute,'17 the court replied that this
was unconvincing for two reasons. First, the test was utilized
in the construction of another state's long-arm statute." 8 Sec-
ondly, it was intended merely as a "general rule for judging
whether jurisdiction exists but does not encompass all fact sit-
distinguished each of the cases cited by Navarro as approving unrelated contacts for
purposes of long-arm jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[i]n all the cases in which juris-
diction was supported by the existence of a contract, the court has held that the
lawsuit must arise from that contractual relationship . . . . The cases cited in
Navarro . . . in no way repudiate that requirement." Id. at 247.
" 449 F. Supp. at 1360 n.2.
"12 Id. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. KND Corp., 83 F.R.D. 556 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
1:3 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
4, Id. at 1219.
,, Id.
116 Id.
"7 Defendant asserted that the nexus requirement had its origin in section three of
the statute providing for service of process upon non-residents "in any action, suit, or
proceedings arising out of business done" within Texas. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964).
1,8 464 F. Supp. 1219.
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uations." 119 In its final observation that U-Anchor "cannot be
read to preclude a court from following federal precedent in
determining due process for purposes of article 2031b," 0 the
court noted that the most recent Fifth Circuit interpreta-
tions121 of Article 2031b cited federal precedent exclusively,
omitting any reference to the O'Brien test."2
In 1980, just one year prior to its decision in Prejean v.
Sonatrach Inc., the Fifth Circuit distinguished U-Anchor on
its facts in Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co.12 3
In dicta, however, the court purported finally to put the Texas
Supreme Court's U-Anchor decision to rest for purposes of in-
terpreting the Texas long-arm statute. After holding that the
defendant's Texas contacts were considerably more substan-
tial than were defendant Burt's in U-Anchor,12 4 the court de-
clared that there was another ground that would indepen-
dently support its assertion of jurisdiction. 2 5 The Fifth
Circuit stated that it was not bound by the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in U-Anchor because that holding was "pred-
icated on the due process clause of the United States Consti-
tution, and the federal courts are not bound by state court
determinations of what the Constitution requires."' ' s In a
footnote the court recognized that this conclusion could possi-
bly lead to disparate results in state and federal courts.'" It
concluded, however, that this possibility did not relieve fed-
eral courts of their duty of "authoritatively interpreting our
l"O Id.
IN See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Walker
v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
"1 464 F. Supp. at 1219.
622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 151. The Fifth Circuit found the case to be controlled by its decision in
Cousteau, rather than by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in U-Anchor, because
defendant Hudco was found more clearly to "resemble" the defendant in Cousteau
than defendant Burt in U-Anchor. Id. at 152.
12s Id. at 152. The court stated that "even if we were to assume arguendo that the
facts of this case were closer to those found in U-Anchor, we would not be bound by
that court's holding ... " Id.
It Id.
1"7 Id. n.5.
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federal Constitution when that document's meaning must be
found . "2... 8
III. THE PREJEAN DECISION
Despite the broad dicta of Hudco, indicating the federal
court's intention to abandon as precedent the state cases re-
quiring a nexus, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prejean
v. Sonatrach, Inc.12 held that Article 2031b "unambiguously
requires a nexus between the plaintiff's cause of action and
the defendant's contacts with Texas."130 In so holding the
court emphasized that this conclusion was mandated by the
literal wording of the statute: "The Texas statute . . . ex-
pressly limits its personal jurisdiction to causes of action aris-
ing out of activities or business done within the state ....
The statute thus unambiguously reaches only suits arising out
of contacts with Texas."'3 1
In a footnote to the opinion, the court distinguished opin-
ions in which it previously held that Article 2031b was in-
tended by the Texas legislature to reach the limits of due pro-
cess. 3 2 The court explained that the cases upon which
plaintiffs relied, including Cousteau, Eyerly, and Jetco, had
"proclaimed this maximum statutory reach in the context of
what were sufficient contacts, not whether the statute re-
quired a nexus.""'e Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that,
even assuming that the Texas legislature had intended the
statute "in its entirety" to reach constitutional limits, this fact
could not "serve to change the unambiguous language of the
statute."
Absent legislative history on the statute, the court ex-
amined the legal background against which Article 2031b was
enacted. It observed that the long-arm statute was passed in
1959, one year after the United States Supreme Court deci-
128 Id.
-2- 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
"3 Id. at 1265.
"s Id. See supra note 17.
. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
"' 652 F.2d at 1266 n.7.
134 Id.
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sion in Hanson v. Denckla.15  The court found it "clear from
the face of the statute" that it was drafted in light of the
Hanson and McGee decisions.' 6 Thus, it concluded that the
statute was designed to "best approximate due process limits
within the shortcomings of drafting specific criteria that pro-
vide guidelines to litigants."1 7 Despite this perceived intent of
the legislature, the Fifth Circuit determined the statute to be
narrower than due process in two respects. First, jurisdiction
might still be held constitutional in certain cases of unrelated
contacts and slight forum contacts, depending upon the na-
ture and quality of those contacts. Secondly, when the defen-
dant's contacts with the forum are substantial and continu-
ous, due process does not require that the cause of action arise
from those contacts. " The Fifth Circuit believed, however,
that the Texas statute did not contemplate extending the as-
serted jurisdiction to either of these cases.
The Fifth Circuit dealt with the plaintiff's reliance on the
"limits of due process" language of U-Anchor by explaining
that this language addressed only the meaning of "doing busi-
ness."' Further, the court noted that in U-Anchor the cause
of action had arisen out of the business done in Texas, a con-
nection noted by the Texas Supreme Court.1 40 The Fifth Cir-
cuit court acknowledged that the case was unclear as to
whether the source of the nexus requirement was statutory or
constitutional, and the court attributed this confusion to the
O'Brien decision.14 1 With regard to the "borrowed" O'Brien
test, the Fifth Circuit concluded, "[a]lthough the Washington
Supreme Court announced the test as a synthesis of the con-
stitutional tests and the requirements of the Washington stat-
ute, which also required that the cause of action arise out of
"' See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
652 F.2d at 1266 n.7. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
" 652 F.2d at 1266 n.7 (emphasis added). See also Comment, The Texas Long-
Arm Statute, Article 2031b: A New Process Is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747 (1976).
18 652 F.2d at 1266 n.7.
I' d. at 1265.
Id. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
"4 652 F.2d at 1266 n.8.
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the contacts with the forum, the Texas Supreme Court
seemed to adopt it as a test for due process.""' The court
added that this was, at least, the view taken by some of the
cases, citing its own opinion in Eyerly.14 3 The court reasoned,
however, that the "confusion over the source of that require-
ment-constitutional or statutory-cannot dictate a different
result." It concluded that, "[a]lthough due process does not
require a nexus, this Court is confident that the Texas Su-
preme Court would require it solely on the basis of the
statute."144
The Fifth Circuit dealt with its own precedential cases sum-
marily. In a footnote, the court observed that some Fifth Cir-
cuit cases expressly required a nexus, citing Wilkerson, Cous-
teau and Eyerly."4 The court maintained that in the other
cases, such as Walker, the issue was never reached.14 6 Still
other cases, the court said, did not address the nexus require-
ment because in those cases the requirement was obviously
met. 1 7 Finally, the Fifth Circuit "expressly disapprove[d]
Navarro's language refusing to require a nexus" and de-
manded that the district court opinion no longer be
followed. " 8
IV. IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Prejean decision will be
observed in its clarification of the proper construction to be
afforded the Texas long-arm statute by the Texas federal
courts. The decision will likely obviate the disparate results
that were certain to occur between state and federal courts in
Texas if the federal courts had persisted in their refusal to
require a nexus in construing Article 2031b; for plainly the
language of the statute does require such a nexus. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that the Texas Supreme Court would ignore
142 Id.
"'3 Id. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.




,48 Id. at 1267. See supra notes'103-12 and accompanying text.
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the "arising out of" language when confronted with a situa-
tion in which the cause of action did not arise from the defen-
dant's forum contacts.
The force of the court's language disapproving the Navarro
decision149 ensures that the federal district courts in Texas
will henceforth require that the plaintiff's cause of action arise
from the non-resident defendant's forum contacts before in
personam jurisdiction will be asserted. As a practical matter,
this will mean that many Texas plaintiffs will be left without
a forum, or without a convenient forum, for their grievances.
Thus, a plaintiff in Mrs. Prejean's position will be forced to
pursue her defendant in the courts of a foreign state or coun-
try. She may no longer predicate in personam jurisdiction
over the non-resident defendant upon that defendant's con-
tinuous and substantial activities in Texas, absent a showing
that her cause of action arises from those activities.
A second possible impact of the Prejean decision may be
seen in future legislation. Throughout its opinion, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the probable leg-
islative intent of Article 2031b was to "approximate" the lim-
its of due process.150 The court, however, found the actual lan-
guage of the statue inoperative to implement this intent. This
statutory inadequacy was attributed to the constraints inher-
ent in the attempt to draft "specific criteria" as guidelines for
litigants.1 51 The court noted that "specific criteria, unlike [a]
comprehensive concept of jurisdiction, may provide litigation
guidelines but are less likely to include [the] full extent due
process permits. 1 5 2 At one point during its opinion, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that the legislature effectuate its original in-
tent by amending the statute.15 3 It also hinted that Texas
should adopt a long-arm statute providing for a comprehen-
sive due process concept of jurisdiction "so as to always in-
"' Id. at 1267.
150 Id. at 1266 n.7.
1"1 Id.
101 Id. (citing Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031b: A New Pro-
cess Is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747, 770-71 (1976).
'53 652 F.2d at 1267 n.7.
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clude the full reach permitted by due process."'" The court
suggested that the "proposed statute would not require but
only take into account any relation between the claim for re-
lief and the contacts with Texas." 1" The obvious message to
the Texas legislature is that the federal courts will no longer
coalesce with the legislature in its supposed intent, in the face
of the statute's literal wording to the contrary. Thus, it is in
the hands of the Texas legislature to remedy the problem of
the Texas plaintiff without a forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The Texas long-arm statute for many years has been a
source of needless confusion in the state's courts. In constru-
ing the statute, the federal courts have refused to look to the
literal wording of Article 2031b, preferring instead to rely
upon the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of that arti-
cle. In so doing, the federal courts were attempting to fulfill
the mandate of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, requiring
their deference to state interpretations of state law. This ad-
herence to the Erie doctrine, however, presented the Fifth
Circuit with the dilemma of having to construe a state statute
as would the state's highest court, in the absence of any ex-
plicit pronouncements on the subject by that court. The fed-
eral courts were forced to extract inferences as to the statute's
meaning from the Texas Supreme Court opinions and to en-
gage in speculation as to whether those opinions were constru-
ing Article 2031b or were analyzing due process limitations.""
The outcome of this confusion was, in several cases, a frustra-
tion of the wording of the statute. The fact that the statute
"unambiguously" requires a nexus, regardless of what the
drafters may have intended, was ignored by the courts, which
were focusing on the "limits of due process" language of
O'Brien and U-Anchor. While such language is no doubt in-
dicative of the Texas Supreme Court's view of the statute, it
I" Id. (citing Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031b: A New Pro-
cess Is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747, 770-73 (1976)).
156 Id.
'" See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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is totally irreconcilable with the language of a statute limiting
personal jurisdiction to causes of action arising out of activi-
ties or business transacted within the state. As the Supreme
Court decisions indicate, due process has been held to encom-
pass unrelated causes of action where the defendant's contacts
are substantial and, in the proper case, even where those con-
tacts are slight.
Thus, in the context of unrelated causes of action the fed-
eral courts were confronted with the nexus requirement of the
statute on the one hand and the "limits of due process" lan-
guage of the Texas Supreme Court on the other. It is highly
improbable, however, that the Supreme Court of Texas, by
stating that the statute reached the limits of due process, ever
intended to edit the words "arising out of" from the statute.
The Fifth Circuit in Prejean offers a more likely explanation
for the use of that language in U-Anchor: that case simply did
not address the question of where the cause of action arose;
rather, it discussed the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts
with Texas. The origin of the cause of action is addressed by
the statute itself, which explicitly requires that the cause of
action arise out of the defendant's transactions in the state.15 7
The Prejean decision thus purports to resolve these irrecon-
cilable differences between the court's pronouncements and
the statutory language. It accomplishes this by limiting the
broad due process language of U-Anchor to the specific fac-
tual context of that case, leaving the statutory nexus require-
ment undisturbed. Henceforth, the federal courts sitting in
Texas are to construe the statute to reach due process limits
only in the context of what is considered "doing business" and
in determining the sufficiency of the forum contacts.
Julie McCoy
.57 Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1981).
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AIRCRAFT FORFEITURE-ILLEGAL ACTIVI-
TIs-Substantive Due Process under the Alaska Constitution
Requires that a Procedure be Available for Remission of an
Aircraft which has been Forfeited Pursuant to a Criminal Vio-
lation in which an Innocent Party has a Security Interest in
such Aircraft. State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
Wilder Rice, a big game guide, was arrested and charged
with transportation of game taken illegally1 and was sen-
tenced to thirty days in jail, a $500 fine, and forfeiture of a
Cessna airplane used in committing the alleged offense. Rice
appealed his conviction to the superior court of Alaska on the
grounds that some form of intent must be implied in the regu-
lation that he was convicted of violating.8 Meanwhile, Cessna
Finance Co. (Cessna) which possessed a security interest in
the airplane was granted leave to intervene in the superior
court proceedings.4 The plea in intervention alleged violations
of Cessna's substantive and procedural due process rights be-
cause it was not given formal notice of the sentencing pro-
ceeding which involved forfeiture of the airplane.5 The supe-
rior court overturned Rice's conviction and vacated the
sentence. The superior court also held that procedural due
process requires "that in order to forfeit a third party's inter-
est in this aircraft or in any other particular item, that notice
and an opportunity to be heard must be given."' 7 The state
then filed for appeal of this procedural due process ruling.
The state also filed a civil action for damages in the supe-
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.070(b) (1973) provides, in part:
(b) The illegal methods and means of taking big game... are
(6) a person who has been airborne may not thereafter take or
assist in taking big game until after 3:00 a.m. following the day
in which the flying occurred ....
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.140(b) (1973) provides, "No person may possess or
transport any game or parts of game illegally taken."
' State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 106 (Alaska 1981).
3 Id. at 106.
1 Id. at 110. Cessna Finance Co. had a security interest in the aircraft of $36,953.16
plus a substantial amount of interest. Id.
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rior court against Rice and another co-defendant, which also
asked for forfeiture of the airplane.8 The state issued a notice
of complaint for forfeiture which was sent to Cessna. Cessna
moved for summary judgment asking, inter alia, that the
Alaska statute be held unconstitutional as violating substan-
tive due process.9 The superior court denied the motion for
summary judgment stating the statute did not violate sub-
stantive due process; Cessna petitioned for review of this rul-
ing.10 The Alaska Supreme Court granted review and the two
cases were consolidated.1" The court agreed to first consider
whether substantive due process was violated by the act of
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.195 (1980) provides:
Forfeiture of equipment. (a) Guns, traps, nets, fishing gear, vessels,
aircraft, other motor vehicles, sleds, and other paraphernalia or gear
used in and in aid of a violation of this title, or regulation promulgated
under this title, and all fish and game or parts of fish and game or
nests or eggs of birds taken, transported or possessed contrary to the
provisions of this title, or regulation promulgated under it, may be for-
feited to the state
(1) upon conviction of the offender in a criminal proceeding of a vio-
lation of this title in a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(2) upon judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in a proceed-
ing in rem that an item specified above was used in or in aid of a
violation of this title or a regulation promulgated under it.
(b) Items specified in (a) of this section may be forfeited under this
section regardless of whether they were seized before instituting the
forfeiture action.
(c) An action for forfeiture under this section may be joined with an
alternative action for damages brought by the state to recover damages
for the value or fish and game or parts of them or nests or eggs of birds
taken, transported or possessed contrary to the provisions of this title
or a regulation promulgated under it.
(d) It is no defense that the person who had the item specified in (a)
of this section in possession at the time of its use and seizure has not
been convicted or acquitted in a criminal proceeding resulting from or
arising out of its use.
(e) No forfeiture may be made of an item subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser in good faith. The burden of proof as to whether
the purchaser purchased the item innocently and in good faith shall be
on the purchaser.
(f) An item forfeited under this section shall be disposed of at the
discretion of the department.
Id.
' 626 P.2d at 106.
10 Id. at 107.
11 Id.
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forfeiture itself, since such a finding would require return of
the airplane and thus render the question of procedural due
process moot.12 Held, reversed in part: Substantive due pro-
cess under the Alaska Constitution" requires that a procedure
be available for remission of an aircraft which has been for-
feited pursuant to a criminal violation in which an innocent
party has a security interest in such aircraft. State v. Rice,
626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
I. THE DEODAND AND THE TRANSFORMATION INTO
FORFEITURE
The history of forfeiture is rooted in the ancient institution
of deodands." It was said as early as biblical times that "[ijf
an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten."1 5 The offending res"
was therefore considered to be the offending party and a det-
riment to society. 17 The res was generally forfeited to the sov-
ereign who was considered to be the true representative of the
transcendent power and was the means to a "religious expia-
's Id. at 110.
" ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just
treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations shall not be
infringed."
U.S. CONST amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. ."
" The word "deodand" is derived from the Latin term deo dandum, a thing to be
given to god. Parker-Harris v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54 (1916). See W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85 (7th ed. 1956); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 23 n.3, Lecture 1 (M. Howe ed. 1963); F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 473 (2d ed. 1909); Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Per-
spectives on Deodands, Forfeiture, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sov-
ereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finkelstein].
,5 Exodus 21:28 (King James). The biblical case of an ox that had gored a person
to death was not considered within the strict sense of forfeiture because the animal
was to be put to death and not returned to the sovereign or society as payment for
the death.
"6 Derived from Latin and meaning in the civil law a thing or object. The term has
a wide and extensive significance including not only things which are objects of prop-
erty, but also such as are not capable of individual ownership. BLACK'S LAW DICION-
ARY 1172 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
" Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 185-86.
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tion" of the lost human life.18 The practice, however, began to
gradually evolve into one that served both as "religious expia-
tion" and as a source of increasing the King's revenues.19 The
justification for the transcending of religious expiation was
founded on the belief that the value of the offending res for-
feited to the King would be redistributed for the good of the
dead man's soul, or to insure that the deodand was put to
charitable purposes.2 The deodand, therefore, served as a ba-
sis for redress of the loss of a human being.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, however, the
rate of accidental deaths increased dramatically and the re-
dress of the deodand became an intolerable remedy for com-
pensating the families of the lost individual.2 1 Accordingly, in
1846 the institution of deodands was abolished with the pas-
sage of the Act for Compensating the Families of Persons
Killed by Accidents (Act).2 The purpose of the Act was to
provide an adequate civil remedy for the accidental death of a
human being.23 The passage of the Act, however, did not com-
pletely extinguish the institution of deodand by the Crown.2
The same year that the Act was passed the Court of the Ex-
chequer decided the case of Regina v. Woodrow.25 This case
established the principle that the offending res could be con-
fiscated for the preservation of the Crown's revenue without
regard to the criminal or negligent culpability of the owner. 6
The holding of the case marked a dramatic departure from
18 Id.
19 Id.
10 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 301 (T. Cooley 4th ed.
1899).
" Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 172.
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62.
, Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 170-71. In fact, there were two bills passed within
a few days of each other. The first, which was passed on August 18, 1846, provided for
the abolition of deodand, and the second, which was passed on August 26, 1846, pro-
vided relief for the dead man's survivors. The two bills were linked together because
Lord Campbell was unwilling to eliminate the deodand institution. Lord Campbell
thought the deodand was an effective deterent to carelessness, especially for the rail-
roads, and that this form of redress should not be destroyed unless the survivors were
granted some form of action. See 77 PARL. DEB. (3rd ser.) 1039 (1845).
1, Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 198-212.
20 15 M. & W. 403, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Exch. 1846).
29 Id.
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the rudimentary religious foundation of deodand and estab-
lished a revenue preservation theory for deodand.27 Therefore,
although the deodand might have ceased to be recognized offi-
cially by virtue of the Act, its effect was still apparent.'8
The first United States Supreme Court case to consider the
forfeiture of rights in property was The Palmyra,'29 decided in
1827. The Palmyra, a ship acting under a commission from
the King of Spain, was captured by the United States and ac-
cused of being used by its crew in acts of piracy on United
States' vessels.3 0 The counsel representing the interests in the
ship argued that the Court could not permit forfeiture be-
cause there was not an act of Congress that provided for per-
sonal punishment of offenders who committed "piratical ag-
gression." 1 The Court refuted this argument, stating that the
proceeding was in rem82 and that the innocence of the owner
was not a defense because the ship was the offending party.8
27 Id.
28 The evolution of the deodand from "religious expiation" to its justification as a
source of revenue for the Crown has been characterized by Mr. Justice Holmes:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity dis-
appears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule
has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how
it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which
seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things;
and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been
found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives a new
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning
which it has received.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5, Lecture 1 (1881).
2 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
20 Id. at 7.
31 Id. at 14.
32 In the strict sense of the term, a proceeding "in rei" is one which is taken
directly against the property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing
itself. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877).
33 25 U.S. at 14-15. The court held:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies,
the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture
did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or, at least,
a consequence, of the judgment or conviction . . . . [Therefore in the
contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not de-
vested [sic], until the conviction. But this doctrine never was applied
to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on
the revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily consid-
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In Dobbin's Distillery v. United States,34 the government
confiscated a leased building when the lessee, a distiller, with
the intent to avoid the revenue taxes, failed to maintain the
proper records as required by law.85 The lessor averred that
he had no knowledge of the illegal acts and therefore his
building should not be confiscated.86 The Court held:
[The] legal conclusion must be that the unlawful acts of the
distiller bind the owner of the property, in respect to the man-
agement of the same, as much as if they were committed by
the owner himself. Power to that effect the law vests in him by
virtue of his lease; and, if he abuses his trust, it is a matter to
be settled between him and his lessor; but the acts of violation
as to the penal consequences to the property are to be consid-
ered just the same as if they were the acts of the owner.3 7
The Court recognized the in rem fiction adopted in The Pal-
myra"8 and allowed the owner only to have recourse against
the culpable party.3 9
The first Supreme Court case to consider the innocent own-
er's fifth amendment protection in forfeited property was
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States," which involved reve-
nue statutes."1 The innocent owner was a car dealer who had
ered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the
thing . . . . [So] the court understands the law to be, that the pro-
ceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any
criminal proceeding in personam.
Id.
U 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
" Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125 (1869) (repealed 1939) provided, in
general, for the taxation and collection procedures for such taxes on distilled spirits
and tobacco. Section 19 of that Act provided that if any false entries were made in
the records, or omitted therefrom, the distillery, distilling apparatus, land and per-
sonal property upon such land should be forfeited to the United States.
" 96 U.S. at 397.
" Id. at 404.
30 25 U.S. 1 (1827). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
n 96 U.S. at 404.
40 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
4 The statute in question, Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98 (1867) (re-
pealed 1939) states:
Whenever any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax
is or shall be imposed, . . . are removed, or are deposited or concealed
in any place, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or
any part thereof, all such goods and commodities, . . shall be for-
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sold an automobile but retained the title as security for the
unpaid purchase price."' The purchaser of the automobile
then illegally transported distilled spirits in violation of the
revenue laws, and at the trial following his apprehension, the
government sought forfeiture of the automobile. 3 The inno-
cent owner asserted that the in rem proceeding, whereby the
thing is considered the offender, irrespective of the guilt or
innocence of the owner, was a mere fiction." He asserted that
due process, as protected under the fifth amendment, requires
an opportunity to present the defense of innocence and
thereby protect his interest in the forfeited property.' 5
The Court recognized the severity of the law and its possi-
ble conflict with the fifth amendment.' The Court then bal-
anced the possible conflict with the fifth amendment against
the government's interest in preserving its "revenues and poli-
cies."''4 Citing Dobbin's Distillery, the Court stated, "[blut
whether the reason for [the law] be artifical or real, it is too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of this
country to be now displaced.'4 8 The Court, thus recognizing
the conflict with the fifth amendment, was nevertheless un-
willing to establish new legal precedent based on the legisla-
tion being challenged and the facts of the case.4" The Court
feited; and in every such case all the casks, vessels, cases, or other
packages whatsoever, containing, or which shall have contained, such
goods or commodities, respectively, and every vessel, boat, cart, car-
riage, or other conveyance whatsoever, and all horses or other animals,
and all things used in the removal or for the deposit or concealment
thereof, respectively shall be forfeited.
Id.
41 254 U.S. at 509.
4 Id. at 508.
" Id. at 506.
4 Id. at 505-06.
40 Id. at 510, where the Court stated: "And it follows, is the contention, that Con-
gress only intended to condemn the interest the possessor of the property might have
to punish his guilt, and not to forfeit the title of the owner who was without guilt."
Id.
41 Id.
46 Id. at 511.
40 The Court noted that under a different set of facts the result of the decision
might be different:
It is said that a Pullman sleeper [rail car] can be forfeited if a bottle of
illicit liquor be taken upon it by a passenger, and that an ocean
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qualified its opinion, however, as to whether it would apply
"to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from
him without his privity or consent."50
Five years later, in Van Oster v. Kansas,51 the Supreme
Court affirmed the view that statutory forfeiture of an inno-
cent owner's property is not in violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.5 2 In this case an automobile
was forfeited after it had been used for transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor in violation of a Kansas statute.53 The owner had
authorized the general use of the automobile but was unaware
of its involvement in a criminal activity. 4 The Court allowed
the forfeiture but again qualified the opinion stating,
[i]t is unnecessary for us to inquire whether the police power of
the state extends to the confiscation of the property of inno-
cent persons appropriated and used by the law breaker without
the owner's consent, for here the offense of unlawful transpor-
tation was committed by one entrusted by the owner with the
possession and use of the offending vehicle.55
In United States v. One Ford Coach," the Supreme Court
gave a liberal interpretation to a statutory remissions proce-
dure 7 for forfeited property. The statute at issue 5  allowed
steamer can be condemned to confiscation if a package of like liquor
be innocently received and transported by it. Whether the indicated
possibilities under the law are justified we are not called upon to con-
sider. It has been in existence since 1866, and has not yet received
such amplitude of application. When such application shall be made it
will be time enough to pronounce upon it.
Id. at 512.
6 Id.
272 U.S. 465 (1926).
" Id. at 468-69.
" Id. at 466.
"Id.
Id. at 467.
307 U.S. 219 (1939).
The petition for remission or mitigation is the remedy most often sought by in-
nocent parties whose property interests are subject to forfeiture. The petition is a
statutory process and generally allows the party to protect his interest in forfeited
property upon a showing that he was not negligent or was unaware of any criminal
activity involving the forfeited property. See Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Pol-
icy: A Proposal For Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661, 671-72 (1978).
" Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 74-347, § 204, 49 Stat.
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the court exclusive jurisdiction to remit or mitigate the forfei-
ture upon a finding that the innocent party acted in good
faith and without negligence.59 In its appeal of the mitigation,
the government averred that the statute should be given strict
construction and further that the innocent owner failed to ful-
fill all the requirements of the statute. In the opinion, the
Court stated, "[tihe forfeiture acts are exceedingly drastic.
They were intended for protection of the revenues, not to
punish without fault."'"
The next case in which the Supreme Court considered an
innocent party's rights in a forfeiture proceeding was thirty-
two years later in United States v. United States Coin &
Currency.6 2 The claimant had been convicted of failure to reg-
ister as a gambler and to pay the related gambling tax re-
quired by federal law." The United States instituted the for-
feiture proceeding to obtain money which the claimant had in
his possession at the time of his arrest.64 The claimant was
subsequently acquitted of the criminal charges and the court
of appeals ordered the money returned.6 The government ap-
pealed this ruling to the Supreme Court.66
The Court again recognized "the difficulty of reconciling the
broad scope of traditional forfeiture doctrine with the require-
ments of the fifth amendment."'7 The Court, quoting Black-
stone, characterized the seizure of property of the innocent
"as based upon a 'superstition' inherited from the 'blind days'
of feudalism." 8 The Court further stated that the broad lan-
872, 878-79 (1935) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976)). This statute allowed
remission of the forfeited item upon a showing (1) that the innocent party acquired
the interest in the property in good faith, (2) that he was unaware of its use in crimi-
nal activity, and (3) that he made a reasonable inquiry into the background of the
party who actually committed the crime. Id.
. 307 U.S. at 221.
10 Id. at 225-26.
11 Id. at 236.
00 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971).
6' Id. at 716.
4 Id.
" Id. at 717.
66 Id.
07 Id. at 721.
08 Id. at 720-21.
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guage of the forfeiture statutes has to be read in conjunction
with the other statutes which regulate forfeiture proceed-
ings." The regulating statutes permit the innocent owner to
prove to the Secretary of the Treasury that the "forfeiture
was incurred without willful negligence or without any inten-
tion on the part of the petitioner to violate the law. .... 
This regulating statute, the Court concluded, indicated that
the forfeiture statutes were intended to impose a penalty only
upon those significantly involved in the criminal enterprise.71
The forfeiture was, therefore, stayed pending outcome of the
criminal conviction of the accused.7'
II. THE MODERN COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF
FORFEITURE
The next major decision by the Supreme Court was thirty-
five years later in Calero-Toledo v. Pear8on Yacht Leasing
Co.," wherein the Court upheld the forfeiture of a pleasure
yacht which the lessee used in violation of the Puerto Rican
drug laws."' The lessor protested the forfeiture on the basis
that the statute unconstitutionally deprived it of property
without just compensation.7 5 The Court made a thorough re-
view of the history of forfeiture in this country and then
Id.
10 Id. The regulating statute involved was the remission statute discussed in note
58, supra.
" 401 U.S. at 721-22.
72 Id.
73 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
74 P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4) (1979) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter .
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels,
which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in clauses (1) and (2) of this
subsection. ...
Id.
76 416 U.S. at 668.
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noted the fifth amendment conflict."' This conflict was bal-
anced against the purposes of the statute, which were identi-
fied as the prevention of further illicit use of the forfeited
property and imposition of an economic penalty, thereby ren-
dering illegal behavior unprofitable. 7 The Court found that
this purpose, as applied to innocent lessors or secured parties,
"may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property. '7 8
The lessor in Calero-Toledo asserted, and the three-judge
district court below agreed, that the Supreme Court's ruling
in United States v. United States Coin & Currency7e man-
dated that the owner's innocence was a defense to the forfei-
ture proceeding.8 0 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
the forfeiture statute at issue in United States Coin & Cur-
rency had to be read in conjunction with another statute that
allowed remission of the forfeiture.81 The presence of the re-
missions statute indicated that, under the challenged forfei-
ture statute, the innocence of the owner would be a valid de-
fense."2 Thus, United States Coin & Currency did not
overrule prior decisions sustaining application of forfeiture
statutes to innocent owners.88 The Court in Calero-Toledo
noted that Puerto Rico's statutes did not contain a remissions
provision; therefore, the innocence of the lessor was irrele-
vant. 4 After determining that the forfeiture would be consti-
tutional, the Court then proceeded, in dictum, to postulate
two possible exceptions to the constitutionality of the forfei-
ture statutes, one based on the lessor's lack of knowledge of or
involvement in the illegal activity, and the other based on his
reasonable precautions against such use.85
" Id. at 680-88.
7 Id. at 686-87.
Id. at 688.
T' 401 U.S. 715 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.





, Id. at 689-90. The Court stated:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the
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It was conceded that the lessor was not given notice of the
seizure, that he was in no way involved in the criminal enter-
prise carried on by the lessee, and that he did not have knowl-
edge that the yacht was being used for such purposes.8 More-
over, the lessor had inserted a provision in the lease
agreement prohibiting the use of the yacht in unlawful activi-
ties. 7 Based on these facts and the dictum cited above, the
Court stated that "in this case appellee [lessor] voluntarily
entrusted the lessee with possession of the yacht, and no alle-
gation has been made or proof offered that the company did
all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to
an unlawful use."' @
Rejection of a plea for relief under the fact situation of
Calero-Toledo makes it difficult to imagine a situation that
would fit within the two possible exceptions enumerated by
the Supreme Cdurt. In fact, the Court's narrow interpretation
indicates the burden of proof required by the innocent owner
could render the possible exceptions moot. 9 Indeed, the sub-
sequent case law in federal and state courts has been in con-
flict in defining the scope of the exceptions.
In United States v. One 1951 Douglas DC-6 Aircraft,a a
holder of a security interest"1 in an aircraft challenged the for-
feiture proceeding on the grounds that it deprived him of his
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture
had been taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the
same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he
had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
scribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be diffi-
cult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not
unduly oppressive.
Id. (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The facts of the case indicate that the lessor
was unaware of the seizure until the lessee became in arrears on the rental payments
and attempted repossession. Id. at 668.
87 Id. at 693.
Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
" See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
" 475 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
A security interest means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1976).
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property without due process of law.2 The secured party fur-
ther claimed he was innocent and unaware of any criminal
wrongdoing.9 In response to this claim the district court held
that the secured party was entitled to a hearing to assert the
narrow exceptions discussed in Calero-Toledo.9 4
The slightly different fact pattern in United States v. One
1976 Chevrolet Corvette,98 concerned a claimant who pur-
chased an automobile after its use in the sale of illegal narcot-
ics." In that case it was stipulated that the claimant was
neither involved in nor aware of the criminal activity concern-
ing the automobile. 7 Though the government sought to have
the automobile forfeited, the court, citing the exception in
Calero-Toledo, held that the forfeiture of the claimant's vehi-
cle would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of
property.98
The question has also arisen in the context of a shipper's
erroneous routing of contraband through the United States.
In Carpenter v. Andrus,99 the Fish & Wildlife Service confis-
cated the skin and skull of a leopard, the importation of
which was forbidden under the Endangered Species Act.100
The owner of the specimen brought an action against the Sec-
retary of the Department of the Interior to enjoin forfeiture of
the skin and skull and to compel the return of the items to
their point of origin in West Germany.'01 The owner had given
the shipper, Lufthansa-German Airlines, specific instructions
not to ship the skin and skull through the United States.1 02 In
acknowledging this fact, the court held that "to construe this
statute in a manner which would allow federal authorities to
obtain the forfeiture of plaintiff's property, based upon a vio-
91 475 F. Supp. at 1057.
I3 d.
" Id. at 1060.
9" 477 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Id. at 33.
" Id. at 33-34.
98 Id. at 34-35.
485 F. Supp. 320 (D. Del. 1980).
100 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
101 485 F. Supp. at 321.
102 Id.
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lation by Lufthansa, would raise a very serious constitutional
issue of due process.'108
In contrast to these decisions, however, is that of Common-
wealth v. One 1978 Ford Van.10 4 In that case, the Ford Motor
Credit Company challenged the forfeiture of an automobile in
which the company had a security interest.'08 The court found
that the secured party had done all that could be expected to
prevent the misuse of the automobile. Nevertheless, the court,
citing Calero-Toledo, held that the forfeiture of the secured
party's interest was not unconstitutional because the secured
party, a sizable commercial financing house, must have fore-
seen and taken into account the occasional loss of a security
interest to forfeiture. 10 6 The court stated, "[t]here is no con-
tention Ford's [Motor Company] losses to forfeiture might be-
come so quantitatively serious that they will impede com-
merce or that those losses will prevent Ford from making a
reasonable return on its investment in this category of loan
taken as a whole.' ' 0 7 The court did not address the narrow
exceptions discussed in Calero-Toledo.
The cases after Calero-Toledo, discussed above, illustrate a
conflict in defining the scope of possible exceptions to a forfei-
ture proceeding. 0 8 This conflict is understandable in light of
the actual decision in Calero-Toledo. Cases allowing forfeiture
narrowly construe the possible exceptions of Calero-Toledo.
These cases generally indicate that under the facts of the par-
ticular case the claimant either did not do all that was practi-
cable to prevent the criminal activity 09 or was aware of such
activity. e10 Other cases, such as Commonwealth v. One 1978
'0' Id. at 323.
104 419 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
105 Id. at 1061. The automobile had been seized by the police following the arrest of
its owners on a charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute. The automobile was forfeited pursuant to the Massachusetts drug laws.
I Id. at 1064.
107 Id.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 90-104.
109 See United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars, 615 F.2d 1 (lst Cir.
1980); United States v. Four Pinball Machines, 429 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Hawaii 1977);
United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, 393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
11 See United States v. One 1977 Cherokee Jeep, 639 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981);
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Ford Motor Van,1 ' do not recognize the dictum in Calero-
Toledo and adhere to the rule that the forfeiture is not uncon-
stitutional as applied to innocent parties.' 1' The cases that
disallow forfeiture take a more expansive reading of the ex-
ceptions in Calero-Toledo and thereby allow the claimants an
opportunity to challenge the proceeding."' It was against this
background of increasing judicial confusion over the rights of
an innocent party in property subject to forfeiture that the
Alaska Supreme Court decided State v. Rice."4
III. STATE v. RICE
In State v. Rice, Cessna Finance Co. asserted that, given its
innocence with respect to the criminal offense upon which the
forfeiture was based, the Alaska statute deprived it of a prop-
erty right without just compensation."15 In light of the long
history of United States Supreme Court decisions,"" the
Alaska court found little relevance for Cessna's position of in-
nocence." 7 Cessna then argued that the statute violated both
the right to due process as protected by the fourteenth
amendment and the state constitution in its failure to provide
United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. One 1.973 Buick Riviera Auto, 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
One 1973 Pace Arrow M300 Motor Home, 379 F. Supp. 223 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
"I See supra note 104.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Twenty-Eight "Mighty Payloader" Coin Operated
Gaming Devices, 623 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. One 1909 Plymouth
Fury Auto, 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Four Pinball Machines,
429 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Hawaii 1977); United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette,
393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Le
Mans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Dollars, 615 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980).
"' See, e.g., United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury Auto, 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp.
1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR7, 397 F. Supp.
1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Moore v. Timmerman, 276 S.E.2d 290 (S.C. 1981).
14 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
"1 Id. at 110-11. Cessna did not contend that the forfeiture statute was unconstitu-
tional with respect to the criminal offenders. Id. at 111.
"' See supra notes 29-61 and acc.ompanying text.
117 626 P.2d at 111-13. The court, however, did not exclude the possibility that the
innocence of the party alone would be a valid defense to the forfeiture under the
Alaska Constitution.
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a statutory remissions procedure such as that interpreted in
United States v. One Ford Coach.118 It was upon this point
that Cessna finally prevailed.
The Alaska court determined the underlying purpose of for-
feiture to be the removal of the dangerous res from society,
thereby ensuring that the res could inflict no future harm on
society. 19 The court quoted one prominent commentator:
The ox that gored a person to death was treated as a real felon
... and was duly executed. The procedure was the natural
consequence of a bona fide concern about a human life and not
a subterfuge by means of which the authorities were aiming to
penalize the owner of the beast.'2"
Recognizing the significance of the legal fiction in biblical
times, the court tempered the doctrine with modern reali-
ties.""' Since the airplane is not a dangerous res, per se, the
court concluded there was no purpose or justification for the
forfeiture without considering the innocent party's constitu-
tionally protected rights.12 2
The fourteenth amendment states that no state shall de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law. 2 8 In Calero-Toledo the United States Supreme
Court stated the justification for forfeiture to be the preven-
tion of further illicit use of the forfeited property and the im-
position of an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal be-
havior unprofitable.' As applied to innocent lessors or
I's 307 U.S. 219 (1939), noted in State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 112 (Alaska 1981).
"' 626 P.2d at 114.
"' Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 252.
Id. at 252, where the court noted:
An automobile that has been used to violate the revenue laws, or the
narcotics laws is not a "dangerous" res .... It is neither more or less
dangerous to the public welfare or safety than any other automobile.
The simple proof of the distinction, of course, is that such confiscated
automobiles are not in fact destroyed, but are ultimately sold, their
proceeds going to the public treasury, while the cars themselves, hav-
ing been publicly "expiated" for being "offending reae," may resume
their normal "life" on the public highways.
Id.
122 626 P.2d at 114.
13 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
184 Colero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974).
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secured parties, the United States Supreme Court felt these
justifications could induce them to exercise greater care in
transferring possession of their property. 2 5 The Alaska court
adopted a somewhat more pragmatic view by noting these jus-
tifications are well served when the property is not returned
to the criminal party, but results in undue hardships when the
statute allowing forfeiture is applied to non-negligent and in-
nocent third parties.126
The Alaska court recognized that the United States Su-
preme Court enumerated two possible defenses to the forfei-
ture proceedings as applied to innocent or non-negligent third
parties. 127 The court, however, doubted the efficacy of these
defenses in light of the actual holding in Calero-Toledo. As
noted above, the cases defining the scope of the possible de-
fenses in Calero-Toledo are in conflict. 12 8 The conflict has
arisen, not because the wording of the defenses in Calero-To-
ledo is ambiguous, but rather because of the inconsistency of
the holding in that case when it is measured against the crite-
ria enumerated therein.12 9 Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Calero-Toledo, concluded that the holding in that case was an
aberration,'3 0 and that its application was as severe as the law
of deodands.' s'
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized the conflict under
the federal constitution and therefore concluded that Calero-
I'l Id. at 687-88.
"26 626 P.2d at 114.
" Id. at 112.
128 See supra notes 108-13.
'2, See infra text accompany notes 130-31.
ISO 416 U.S. at 693-95, wherein Douglas, J. stated in dissent:
If the yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs, those
who claim forfeiture might have equity on their side. But no such
showing was made; and so far as we know only one marihuana ciga-
rette was found on the yacht. We deal here with trivia where harsh
judge made law should be tempered with justice. I realize that the an-
cient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate object itself is
guilty of wrongdoing. United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-720. But that traditional forfeiture doctrine
cannot at times be reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 721. Such a case is the present one.
Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 14-28.
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Toledo stood for the proposition that forfeiture of the interest
of an innocent security holder is not violative of federal sub-
stantive due process.'5 ' The court, however, did interpret the
exceptions of Calero-Toledo as protecting the rights of an
owner as opposed to a security holder. "8 The court arrived at
this conclusion from the statement in Calero-Toledo that the
purposes of forfeiture can be served by its application to "les-
sors, bailors, or secured creditors" by inducing them to use
greater care in transferring possession of their property.'3' In
Calero-Toledo, however, the innocent party was the "lessor"
as well as the owner of the property. "' The United States Su-
preme Court, therefore, did not draw a distinction between
owners and "lessors, bailors, or secured creditors" in enumer-
ating the possible defenses." 6 Accordingly, the Alaska Su-
preme Court erred in its interpretation of the United States
Supreme Court's decision.
The import of the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis of
Calero-Toledo and its progeny in the federal courts is that the
judicial guidance is somewhat less than clear, and therefore,
that the federal constitution cannot be relied on as a firm ba-
sis for decision. 3 7 This conclusion led the court to resort to
the Alaska Constutition wherein the court incorporated the
defenses of Calero-Toledo, without a distinction between the
owners and "lessors, bailors and secured parties."'' The dis-
tinction was not important, as noted above,' 3 9 but resort by
the court to the Alaska Constitution meant that the case was,
in effect, unreviewable by the United States Supreme
Court. "1 0 By relying on the state constitution the court
,31 626 P.2d at 112.
3' Id.
13 416 U.S. at 687-88.
13 Id. at 665.
136 Id. at 690.
117 See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
' 626 P.2d at 112-13.
119 See supra text accompanying note 136.
140 The Supreme Court does not review state court decisions resting upon "ade-
quate and independent state grounds." Any effort to obtain review of such decisions
is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Justice Jackson, in Herb v. Pitcair, 324 U.S. 117-
125 (1945), summarized the rule as follows:
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avoided the necessity of drawing distinctions between various
innocent parties, and more importantly also avoided the
threshold question of whether the defenses in Calero-Toledo
were obiter dictum or law."
IV. CONCLUSION
Rice represents an attempt on the part of the Alaska court
to finally step forward and discard the legal fiction of the "of-
fending res. ''"' The doctrine derived from the "goring ox" is
anachronistic and should be tempered in light of present day
realities. This is not to say that forfeiture has no place in to-
day's society. The goals of the doctrine, however, should be
examined and merged with the constitutional requirements.
The basic premise of the deodand was to remove the of-
fending res from society.14 3 This goal can be achieved when
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the princi-
ple that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on ade-
quate and independent state grounds. . . [The] reason is so obvious
that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in the
partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems
and in the limitation of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over
state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally HART AND WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS, ch. 5 (2d
ed. 1973); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, ch. 12 (3d ed. 1976).
' See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. The court held:
[I]f a party can show "the manner in which the property came into
possession of such other person" and that "prior to parting with the
property he did not know, nor have reasonable cause to believe [ei-
ther] that the property would be used to violate [the law or,] ...that
the violator had a criminal record or a reputation for commercial
crime," substantive due process under the Alaska Contstitution re-
quires that a procedure be available for remission of the forfeited item.
626 P.2d at 114.
1I The progressive opinion of the courts is reminiscent of the often quoted Vice
Chancellor Jayne:
It is the peculiar genius and strength of the common law that no deci-
sion is stare decisis when it has lost its usefulness in our social evolu-
tion; it is distinguished, and if times have sufficiently changed, over-
ruled. Judicial opinions do not always preserve the social statics of
another generation.
Carroll v. Local No. 269, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223,
225 (N.J. Ch. 1943).
U3 See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
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the res is taken from the perpetrator of the crime. Drug-smug-
glers are certainly deterred when their modes of transporta-
tion are confiscated, thereby rendering them immobile or
financially incapable of acquiring new assets.14  Certainly the
game hunter in Rice will think twice before he transports ille-
gally killed wildlife again. Additionally, the deterrent goal is
justifiably achieved when an "innocent" party is not crimi-
nally liable but remains culpable. The law should not draw a
distinction between actual perpetrators of crime and those
that knowingly supply the "tools of the trade." The excep-
tions of Calero-Toledo certainly took these individuals into
account. The desire to deter crime and protect society is also
served by confiscating property sold to individuals with
known criminal records, but the justifications when an inno-
cent and non-negligent lienor is involved must be critically
analyzed.
The courts should allow forfeiture only when it will result in
the removal of the dangerous res from society or punishment
of the criminally culpable party. It is upon this basis only that
the forfeiture statutes should be justified. There may be cases
wherein the forfeiture of the property rights of the innocent
party could be justified. The person that supplies the res with
full knowledge of its intended use is as culpable as the perpe-
trator of the crime. Under these circumstances the goals of
the forfeiture are justified, but these exceptions must be
merged with the constitutional requirements of the fifth
amendment. This balance can only be achieved through a def-
inite statutory scheme outlining remission and mitigation in a
manner that is effectively reviewable by the courts. This mode
of analysis assures the innocent property owner that his prop-
erty rights will not be infringed, and it was this method that
the Alaska court adopted.
Daniel W. Rabun
144 See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976); Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law
and Policy: A Proposal For Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661 (1978); Note, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977).
